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Abstract 
 
 
 
China’s emergence as a global power is raising interest globally. This includes a rise in trade 
relations with Africa over the last two decades. China’s relations with Africa have undergone 
several changes since the onset of modern China-Africa relations in 1955. In the current 
phase, relations have been marked by increasing economic interdependence. During the same 
period, China has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with many countries in different 
continents and African countries have also embarked on their own FTAs. However, no FTAs 
have yet been signed between China and any country in Africa. This thesis examines the 
question: What are the Prospects of China Signing FTAs in Africa? This thesis documents 
the growth of China-Africa trade over the last two decades, analyses the reasons why China 
signs FTAs, and assesses whether three African countries, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan 
meet the criteria for China’s FTA partners. The thesis finds that there is a slim chance that 
China will sign FTAs with any of these three African countries in the near term, because 
African countries are at the fringe of China’s foreign policy. African issues are rarely 
discussed at the highest decision-making authority in China, and China’s FTAs with African 
countries may have impacts on the latter’s manufacturing sectors. Over the medium-longer 
term, South Africa is probably the most likely candidate of the three countries for a FTA with 
China.  
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What are the Prospects of China Signing FTAs in Africa? 
Chapter One 
 
1.1 Background: A Growing Relationship  
China’s emergence as a global power is raising interest globally. This includes a rise in trade 
relations with Africa over the last two decades. The increases in trade over the past two 
decades raise questions concerning whether a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) might be the next 
step in the growing China-Africa relationship. China has signed FTAs with many countries in 
different continents; African countries have signed FTAs between themselves and with 
others. However, as yet there has been no FTA between China and any African country.  This 
thesis will examine this question: What are the prospects of China signing FTAs in Africa? 
As background, I will document the growth of China-Africa economic relations over the last 
two decades. This will provide the context for thinking why a FTA might be a possibility.   
In recent years, Africa has witnessed a tremendous improvement in its relations with China. 
The improvement reflects evidence of policy shifts in China-Africa relations, ranging from 
revolutionary changes within the Maoist paradigm to promoting international trade and 
investment in Africa. The policy shifts align with China’s domestic economic development.  
In the 1990s, China’s foreign economic policy was formulated with the long-term objective 
of implementing a diversified market strategy. The re-formulated policy prioritised trade and 
investment, while ideological issues were relegated to the background (Shelton 2001, 113).  
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Since the 1990s, a central part of the new strategies has been to promote trade and economic 
cooperation. This initiative led China to set up investment and trade centres in Africa (ibid). 1  
The trade centres were intended to form a key instrument through which China would 
increase bilateral trade (Shelton 2001). China’s growing economic relationship with Africa is 
reflected in: increased volumes of China-Africa trade; investment- flows; and cooperation in 
several sectors, such as oil exploration, manufacturing and infrastructural development. In the 
1960s, when China-Africa trade relations began, the volume of trade totalled $121 million 
(Sun 2014, 7).  In 1996, China’s trade with Africa was $4.03 billion. China’s exports 
accounted for $2.56 billion and its imports totalled $1.46 billion (Lihua 2006, 26).  In 2005, 
the volume of trade between China and Africa was $40 billion (ibid). The share of Africa’s 
trade with China (exports and imports) reached 16 percent in 2011, increasing from 
negligible shares in the 1990s (Drummond and Liu 2013, 6). 
Table 1.1 shows that the volume of trade between China and Africa increased to $55 billion 
in 2006 (Sun 2014) from $11 billion in 2000. Trade further increased to $73 billion in 2007 
(Besada et al. 2008, 6).  In 2012, China-Africa trade reached approximately $199 billion. Out 
of this total for 2012, 42 percent represents exports from Africa, and 58 percent represents 
imports to Africa. This pattern results in a trade deficit for Africa of $27.9 billion (Sun 2014, 
7). 
 
 
  
                                       
1China established trade centres in Egypt, Guinea, Cameroon, Mali Gabon, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Mozambique. Chinese trade centres provide local information to Chinese businesses. They are to 
assist Chinese investment by providing information to both local and Chinese businesses considering 
investing or trading, and a degree of logistical support with business start-ups.  
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Table 1.1: China-Africa Trade Volume (Actual and Projected) 
      Year Amount (USD, billion) 
2000 11 
2005 40 
2006 55 
2007 73 
2012 199 
2013 210 
2015 172 
2020 400 (Projected) 
Sources: Compiled by Author with data from (Besada et al. 2008; Sun 2014; UN Comtrade 
2016). 
According to trade related data from Chinese Customs, the China-Africa trade volume in 
2013 hit a record high of $210 billion (Muilkelela 2014). In 2015, the Chinese Premier, 
Keqiang Li, set the target for bilateral trade volume to top $400 billion in 2020 (Li 2014). 
This has been widely interpreted to mean China is ultimately interested in increasing its trade 
in energy or other mineral products. But as Besada et al. (2008) point out, the trade volume is 
a reflection of overall Chinese trade policies, which are aimed at promoting trade with Africa 
generally and not specifically for a single product (Besada et al. 2008, 6).  
Historically, the focus of China’s trade policies played a critical role in its trade relations. 
Trade policies also reflected Chinese ideological changes concerning external trade relations, 
in which economic participation in Africa and elsewhere was not left to State-Owned 
Enterprises2 (SOEs) alone. Private enterprises have also become key players in China-Africa 
                                       
2 A state-owned enterprise (SOE) is a legal entity that is created by the government in order to partake 
in commercial activities on the government's behalf. 
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trade relations. Changes in trade policies increased trade and investment, including the 
number of private enterprises investing in Africa. According to Yuan (2014), there are about 
2000 Chinese companies that have invested in Africa. In the last few years, Chinese private 
companies have increased the number of their projects from less than 60 in 2005 to 1,217 in 
2013 (Shen 2015, 87). It is necessary to inquire into the factors that have contributed to the 
surge in trade between China and Africa.  
The surge in trade volumes between China and Africa also reflects a connection between 
China’s trade policies and the removal of tariffs. For example, in 2005, China removed tariffs 
on 196 imports from 28 countries in Africa (Yuan 2014). In 2006, duty-free imports from 
Africa totalled more than $350 million, and duty-free exports expanded in 2007 to cover 454 
items (ibid). With the increase in China-Africa trade volumes, African countries’ economies 
were exposed to China’s domestic development through direct trade expansion. Two key 
developments contributed to the higher export exposure to China. Firstly, the region 
experienced an expansion in international trade, including its trade with China.  For example, 
between 2001 and 2012, the value of African countries’ exports increased by an annual 
average of about 15 percent, and exports to China accounted for 2.5 percentage points of that 
growth (Drummond and Liu 2013, 10).  Secondly, many African countries’ exports to China 
surpassed their export growth.  China’s contribution to African export growth is an important 
factor in explaining the approximately 30 percent of total export growth in 2005-2012 (ibid). 
China’s contributions to the growth of the region’s exports rose from 3 percentage points in 
2003 and 2004 to 5 percentage points between 2005 and 2009 (ibid).  
Natural resource availability and a large population are key factors with respect to China’s 
trade with African countries. China’s imports from Africa are concentrated in Sudan, Congo, 
Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Equatorial Guinea. These countries have 
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abundant natural resources.  These countries account for 75 per cent of exports from Africa to 
China (Drummond and Liu 2013, 9). Six countries, namely, Nigeria, South Africa, Liberia, 
Ghana, Benin Republic, and Angola are the largest importers from China (ibid). With the 
exception of Benin Republic, all other countries have a large population, which translates to 
market potential. African countries’ main exports to China are concentrated in primary 
products such as oil and other minerals. Imports from China are mainly machinery and 
manufactured goods (ibid).  In 2011, over 80 percent of China’s imports from Africa were 
comprised crude oil, and other natural resources (Sun 2014, 7). Incontrovertibly, trade 
between China and Africa has increased in the last decade. Even so, trade volumes in 2012 
were approximately $199 billion; this represents merely 5 percent of China’s global trade 
(ibid, 14).  
In addition to trade, China has also invested in Africa in other ways. China’s Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)3 in Africa consists of both Chinese SOEs and private sector firms. While 
SOEs are investing in resource extraction and infrastructure, Chinese private sector firms are 
investing in manufacturing and communication sectors (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009, 552-
553). China’s private sector controls 53 per cent of overall Chinese investment projects in 
Africa and SOEs control 47 per cent of the projects respectively (Shen 2015, 87). China’s 
FDI in Africa is noticeable in many sectors. According to Kaplinsky and Morris (2009), 
services in construction accounted for 18 percent of Chinese FDI, while resource extraction 
accounted for 28 percent, and 46 percent of manufacturing investment occurred in the textile 
sector between 1979 and 2000. China’s FDI in oil and gas exploration is largely concentrated 
in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Gabon, and investments worth $757 
                                       
3 A Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an investment made by a company or individual in one 
country in business interests in another country, in the form of either establishing business operations 
or acquiring business assets in the other country, such as ownership or controlling interest in a foreign 
company. 
6 
 
PLOOLRQDQGELOOLRQKDYHEHHQPDGHLQWKH6XGDQHVHDQG1LJHULDQRLOILHOGVUHVSHFWLYHO\
LELG  6LQFH  &KLQD¶V IORZ RI )', LQ $IULFD KDV LQFUHDVHG %HWZHHQ  DQG
 &KLQHVH LQYHVWPHQW LQFUHDVHG IURP  ELOOLRQ WR  ELOOLRQ 6XQ  
&KLQD¶V )', IXUWKHU LQFUHDVHG WR  ELOOLRQ LQ  &RSOH\  3URPRWLQJ )', LQ
$IULFDZDVPDGHSRVVLEOHWKURXJKD&KLQD$IULFD'HYHORSPHQW)XQGRIELOOLRQ%HVDGDHW
DO$OWRJHWKHU&KLQD¶VLQYHVWPHQWSURILOHLQ$IULFDLVLQFUHDVLQJ
)LJXUH&KLQD¶V7RS)','HVWLQDWLRQ&RXQWULHVLQ$IULFD

6RXUFH&KLQD¶V0LQLVWU\RI&RPPHUFH7UDQVDFWLRQOHYHO2','DWD

)LJXUH  DERYH VKRZV WKH QXPEHU RI ILUPV WKDW KDG LQYHVWHG LQ HDFK RI WKH $IULFDQ
FRXQWULHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH QXPEHU RI SURMHFWV )LJXUH  DOVR LOOXVWUDWHV WKDW&KLQHVH )', LV
GHVWLQHG IRU UHVRXUFH ULFK FRXQWULHV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH WKUHH FRXQWULHV 1LJHULD 6RXWK$IULFD
DQG=DPELDZLWK WKHKLJKHVWQXPEHURISURMHFWVDQGILUPVKDYHPDUNHWSRWHQWLDO1LJHULD
IRU H[DPSOH KDV ODUJH RLO UHVHUYHV ZKLOH 6RXWK $IULFD KDV FRSSHU DQG RWKHU PLQHUDOV
=DPELD DOVRKDVPLQLQJSRWHQWLDO IRU&KLQHVH ILUPV 7KLVPDUNHWSRWHQWLDO VWHPV IURP WKH
DELOLW\ WKHVH FRXQWULHVKDYH WR VHUYH DV DKXE WR IDFLOLWDWH WUDGHZLWKRWKHUPDUNHWV LQ WKHLU
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
N
ig
er
ia
So
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
Za
m
b
ia
Et
h
io
p
ia
Eg
p
yt
C
o
n
go
(D
R
C
)
G
h
an
a
A
n
go
la
Zi
m
b
ab
w
e
Ta
n
za
n
ia
Su
d
an
K
en
ya
A
lg
er
ia
M
o
za
m
b
ia
q
u
e
U
ga
n
d
a
G
ab
o
n
M
al
i
N
am
ib
ia
M
au
ri
ti
u
s
C
am
er
o
o
n
China's Top 20 FDI destination countries in Africa 
# Projects # firms
 7 
 
respective regions. Nigeria and South Africa serve as market hubs, while Zambia is also a 
hub to a large extent  
In addition, China’s investment in Africa has replaced Western aid, which has been declining 
(Guardian 2010). China has committed US$75 billion on aid and development projects in 
Africa in the past decade (Provost and Harris 2013). Meanwhile, Western development 
partners are relinquishing their interests in sectors that are critical to Africa’s economic 
development. According to Konings (2007, 354-356), Chinese firms are willing to invest 
where Western companies are unwilling. Western investors and aid agencies are unwilling to 
invest in areas such as physical infrastructure, industry, and agriculture (ibid). These are areas 
that are crucial to African development. Since the late 1970s, the United States Agency for 
International Development4 (USAID) has not funded heavy infrastructure projects in Africa. 
In the 1990s, the World Bank and USAID reduced their support for agriculture; this reduction 
measured as high as 90 percent (Konings 2007, 357).  As an example of reduced support for 
agriculture, the World Bank revoked its support for palm oil farmers in Africa because of 
pressure from environmental Non-Governmental Organisations5 (NGOs) (Ayodele 2010). In 
contrast, Chinese firms have committed to huge investments in upgrading Africa’s 
infrastructure. For the past few years, Chinese companies have built bridges, upgraded 
railroads, developed telecommunication networks, and provided other much-needed 
infrastructure. The Chinese government imposes no economic conditions on African 
governments before signing contracts: not for exploration, nor other economic activities 
(Konings 2007, 352). In addition, Western companies would not stake their investments in 
                                       
4 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the United States Government 
agency which is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid. 
5 A non-governmental organization (NGO) is a not-for-profit organization that is independent from 
states and international governmental organizations. They are usually funded by donations but some 
avoid formal funding altogether and are run primarily by volunteers. 
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many of the deals closed by Chinese firms in Africa. For example, in 2005, China and 
Nigeria signed an $800 million crude oil sale agreement. This, in turn, led to China’s 
purchase of 30,000 barrels per day for five years. China also won a license in 2006 to operate 
four oil blocks; all this occurred amid a slowing crude market where Western oil companies, 
like Shell, were divesting (Konings 2007, 354).  
Chinese investment provides additional sources of investment capital at a time when aid 
alone is unable to address unemployment and alleviate poverty (ibid). The investment has 
generated significant multiplier effects in the local economy by the way of sourcing and 
providing local management expertise and technology transfer. As such, China has indicated 
its readiness to support Africa’s product value chain (Haroz 2011, 75). This value chain is 
achieved through building more factories to process African raw materials in Africa, rather 
than just extracting low value-added products (ibid). For example, a Chinese baggage 
manufacturing company commenced trading in Africa in 2000. In 2003, the company 
established a factory in Nigeria, which serves the domestic market in Nigeria, brings revenue 
to the government, and supplies other countries, such as Ghana (Gu 2009, 575). In addition, 
Chinese investors established joint fish processing ventures in Gabon and Namibia (Konings 
2007, 355).  
African imports from China may be more diverse, but they are predominantly manufactured 
goods (Ncube 2010, 5). This is because Chinese products are generally considered to be 
appropriate for the demand in Africa. Their prices are generally cheap and are easily 
affordable by a large number of people. These products fit the income level in each African 
country (ibid). The relatively low prices of mobile phones in Africa are largely attributed to 
an influx of Chinese phones that flooded the African markets. This ultimately drives down 
the price of other market suppliers. Lowered prices give millions of people in Africa access 
 9 
 
to mobile phones (ibid, 6). Similarly, accessibility to computers has increased because of 
cheap, imported computers from China.  This imported merchandise has allowed many 
impoverished families to have access to computers, which were once owned exclusively by 
the rich in African countries (ibid). China greatly assisted in driving down the prices to the 
level where these goods are within reach of many, rather than just a few.  
There is indeed evidence of growing economic links between China and Africa. One may ask 
whether a FTA will be the next step in the relationship. It should be noted that a ‘Regional 
Trade Agreement’ (RTA) is a collective term used by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
to refer to FTAs and other regional preferential trading agreements (PTA) such as customs 
unions. In this study, FTAs and regional preferential trading agreements (PTAs) will be used 
inter-changeably. A FTA is “any trading arrangement which permits the importation of goods 
from countries signatory to the preference at lower rates of duty than are imposed on imports 
from third countries” (Krueger 1997b, 173).  It is an agreement between two or more 
countries to remove trade barriers such as tariffs and import quotas. FTAs emerged from the 
failure of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6 and other global multilateral 
trade frameworks to serve the specific needs of countries (Krueger 1999).  A FTA, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, may be expected to increase both trade and FDI flows further. 
Certainly China and Africa have been active in signing FTAs with other countries as a way of 
further enhancing their economic relations and facilitating trade and investment. The 
involvement of China and African countries in FTAs is demonstrated in the next section.   
 
                                       
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral agreement regulating 
international trade. Its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the 
elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis." 
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1.2 China and African Countries Existing FTAs 
Prior to 2002, China had signed no FTAs. According to Gao (2009), there are three main 
reasons FTAs were not appealing to China. First, China’s exports were meant for the United 
States (US), the European Union (EU), and Japan. These countries provided adequate 
markets for China because its exports at the time were low. There was no need for China to 
look for export markets elsewhere. Moreover, China was faced with the difficulty of 
negotiating FTAs with these countries. Gao (ibid) further argues that it was a sheer waste of 
time for China to negotiate FTAs with other countries because of its low trade volume and 
the difficulties associated with negotiating terms under such trade volumes. The second 
reason is that China was constrained on resources, since its efforts were geared toward 
resuming its contracting party status under the GATT. Gao (ibid) further explains that when 
resuming its contracting party status under GATT failed, China devoted its efforts on the 
World Trade Organisation7 (WTO) accession talks.  Given that China’s resources were 
devoted to the complicated accession process at a historic moment for the GATT/ WTO, 
China did not have the luxury of engaging in FTA talks (ibid). Finally, Gao (2009) argues 
that it would not be strategic for China to simultaneously start FTA negotiations in 
conjunction with WTO accession talks. At that point, any FTA negotiation on the part of 
China might have led to doubts about its commitments to multilateral trade agreements. Also, 
if China had been able to proceed with FTA negotiations at that time, negotiations would 
have required China to offer more than it was willing to give at the multilateral level (ibid, 2).  
Ravenhill and Jiang (2009, 28) further argue that China’s unwillingness to negotiate FTAs 
had much to do with concerns that such arrangements might undermine the multilateral trade 
                                       
7 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the 
rules of trade between states. 
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framework. This attitude was a pragmatic response to the sensitivities of negotiations over its 
WTO accession. According to Kwei, China was less inclined to negotiate FTAs because of 
four key reasons:  
(i) China believed its future was not at mercy of FTAs but on multilateral or 
similar regional frameworks; (ii) China believed its highly attractive market 
with economic leverage provided less motivation to engage in FTAs; (iii) 
China also believed were it to negotiate FTAs, it would follow a pragmatic 
logic just like other countries regarding the complementary nature of FTAs: 
with overall trade liberalisation, but with a caveat that it would do so at its 
pace; and (iv) if China were to sign FTAs, it would do so primarily for 
political rather than economic reasons (2006, 117).  
Zeng (2010, 642) argues that China’s interest in FTAs increased because of its desire to 
create additional institutionalised bargaining forums that could help to stabilise expectations 
over trade negotiations. This is also consistent with China’s goals of using FTAs to control 
the pace of liberalisation at home (ibid, 636).  As a matter of fact, Chinese officials were of 
the view that FTAs were complementary to multilateral trade agreements, under the WTO, to 
which they assiduously negotiated their accession (Hoadley and Yang 2007, 331). 
China’s willingness to pursue bilateral8 as well as multilateral9 agreements is obvious. The 
adoption of bilateralism is not peculiar to China. Many trading powers, such the US and the 
EU, have done the same. It is reasonable to infer that since China is a latecomer to FTAs, 
China is merely responding to what can be called the “peer pressure” theory of FTAs (Zhao 
and Webster 2011, 82).  According to Zhao and Webster, China prefers bilateralism 
irrespective of the advantage offered by multilateralism because:  
(a) it allows China to conclude the agreement in a manner that is consistent 
with itself and its partners. In this regard, it is suitable to meet specific 
needs, which include: goods to liberalise, or goods to protect; (b) many of 
                                       
8 Bilateral is an agreement between two countries or a single country signing an agreement with an 
economic bloc. 
9 Multilateral is an agreement between three or more countries. 
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the areas not covered by multilateral commitments can be included in 
FTAs; and (c) bilateral FTAs give China more room to customise the 
arrangements to meet specific needs and circumstances of any relationship 
(2011, 84).  
How these factors play out with regards to how China chooses its FTA partners will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. China’s current FTA partners, and the years when their respective 
agreements were signed, are shown Table 1.2. 
The first FTA signed by China was the ASEAN10-China FTA in 2002. In 2003, China signed 
additional FTAs. Since then, China has continued to either sign, or negotiate, FTAs with 
many countries.  
 
  
                                       
10 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an organization of countries in southeast 
Asia set up to promote cultural, economic and political development in the region. ASEAN has 10 
member states. 
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Table 1.2: China FTAs 
Country Signed and In Effect  Signed not In Effect Year 
ASEAN-China FTA    2002 
Hong Kong- China 
Closer Economic 
Partnership 
   2003 
 
Macao-China Closer 
Economic Partnership 
Arrangement 
   2003 
Thailand-China FTA    2003 
Chile China FTA    2005 
Pakistan-China FTA    2006 
New Zealand-China 
FTA 
   2008 
Singapore-China FTA    2008 
Peru-China FTA    2009 
Taiwan China 
Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement 
   2010 
Costa Rica-China FTA    2010 
Iceland-China FTA    2013 
Switzerland-China 
FTA 
   2014 
Australia-China FTA     2015 
Source: Asian Development Bank 2016 
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Turning now to Africa, many countries in the region have shown a willingness to enter into 
trade agreements.  During the period of European colonisation, African countries traded 
among themselves.  What is debatable is the extent to which African countries were able to 
trade among themselves because of the tariff structures that might have existed between 
countries. Against this backdrop, there have been many trade-blocs that have emerged within 
Africa. These trade-blocs are regionally based, but all share the aim of fostering trade among 
themselves.  Moreover, many of the trade agreements are Customs Unions, Free Trade 
Agreement, Economic Partnership Agreements or Preferential Trade Agreements.  
For many years, West African countries have relied on the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS).11 This regional trade-bloc was created to boost exports to 
member states, as well as to the rest of the world. Imports into the region are, therefore, seen 
as complementary to the exports of goods and services (ECOWAS 2016). The Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU)12 is another trade agreement, formed after the model of a 
Customs Union. The East Africa Community (EAC)13 is another trade-bloc in Africa, which 
includes the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).14 COMESA was 
formed in December 1994 to replace the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA) from the early 
1980s in Eastern and Southern Africa. COMESA is a free trade area and its member 
countries launched a Customs Union in 2009. In order to make it an expanded free trade 
                                       
11 ECOWAS is a 15-member nation comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D' Ivore, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria ,Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo. 
12 SACU Comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
13 The East Africa Community comprises Kenya, Uganda,  the United Republic of Tanzania, Republic 
of Burundi and Republic of Rwanda. 
14 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa countries include: Burundi, Comoros, D.R. 
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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zone, two other trading blocs, the East Africa Community15 (EAC) and the Southern African 
Development Community16 (SADC), agreed to the expansion. The SADC is a FTA among 
member states. The agreement covers most products. According to the South Africa Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, a FTA with 85 percent duty-free trade was achieved in 2008; when the 
SADC attains a fully-fledged FTA status, 15 percent of trade constituting the sensitive list is 
expected to be liberalised (South Africa DTI n.d.). 
Just as African countries have trade agreements among themselves, African countries have 
also signed trade agreements with countries or trading blocs outside of Africa.   One good 
example is the FTA between the SACU and the European Free Trade Association.17 The 
agreement covered tariff reductions on selected goods, such as industrial goods and processed 
agricultural products.  There is also the Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement 
which is a FTA between South Africa and the EU. The crux of the agreement is that the EU 
offered to liberalise 95 percent of its duties on products originating in South Africa while 
offering to liberalise 86 percent of its duties on products originating in the EU (ibid). In 
addition, African countries have signed the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act18 (AGOA) 
with the US. This agreement is referred to as a unilateral assistance measure, because there is 
no reciprocal commitment on African countries to allow duty-free access for some US 
products.  Some African countries have also signed an Economic Partnership Agreement, 
which involves the EU.  
                                       
15 The EAC is a regional intergovernmental organisation of 6 Partner States: the Republics of 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of 
Uganda. 
16 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization. Its 
goal is to further socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security 
cooperation among 15 southern African states. Southern African Development Community member 
states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
17 Countries involved- SACU and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
18 AGOA involves 39 countries in Africa. 
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Realising the benefits of trade, African countries are also creating a single continental market 
for goods and services, with the free movement of business persons and investments. In this 
connection, African countries have commenced the negotiation of a Continental Free Trade 
Agreement (CFTA). The negotiations were launched in 2015; by the end of 2017 the 
negotiations are expected to be completed and the agreement for the CFTA signed. The 
CFTA will involve 54 member states across Africa, and be the world’s largest free-trade area, 
in terms of the number of countries (The Washington Post 2016). The CFTA will 
complement the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) launched in 2015, which involves 27 
African countries, extending from Egypt to South Africa, and includes all the regional trading 
blocs (ibid). China has signed many FTAs and African countries have also entered into 
FTAs, but both are yet to sign FTAs with each other. In summary, African countries have 
demonstrated a commitment to trade openness and agreements, as has China. Might a FTA 
between China and one or more African countries be the next step?  This might seem a 
possibility since, firstly, FTAs are part of China’s “Going Out” strategy; Africa would seem 
to fit perfectly into this strategy, as China needs the continent’s large natural resource 
endowment to boost its domestic economic growth. Secondly, China’s previous engagement 
with African countries has been cordial and beneficial (Gu 2009). 
1.3 Research Questions 
The central question to be addressed in the research is: “What are the prospects of China 
Signing FTAs in Africa? In order to adequately address this question, the following inter-
related sub-questions will be explored: 
(i) What are the factors contributing to the formation of FTAs generally? 
(ii) Were these factors present in the recent FTAs between China and countries in 
Asia, Latin America, and Oceania? 
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(iii) To what extent should we expect the factors to enhance potential FTAs 
between China and African countries? 
(iv) Will there be FTAs between China and Africa in the near future? What form 
would FTAs between China and African countries most likely take, given the 
factors in (i) and (ii) and the African context, bilateral or multilateral, and 
(v) What are the constraints and/or impediments to potential FTAs between China 
and African countries? 
1.4  Justification 
This study is important in understanding more about China’s foreign policy in general, 
especially as it relates to Africa. Specifically, this study is expected to shine more light on the 
nature of Chinese interests in Africa and examine how and why China signs FTAs. Knowing 
more about the conditions and criteria of China’s FTAs will add to the existing literature on 
China’s renewed interests in Africa and whether the interest is mutually beneficial or 
otherwise. The findings will help African governments to properly assess their relationships 
and expectations with respect to engagement with China. 
1.5  Motivation 
The motivation of this thesis has much to do with the China-Africa policy context. Bilateral 
trade agreements, such as FTAs, are often argued to be mutually beneficial to countries that 
are signatories to the agreement in terms of increasing in trade, increasing FDI, and 
encouraging reforms. Many countries that have signed FTAs with China have witnessed 
increased trade and FDI. It is of interest to also understand whether China and African 
countries can sign FTAs and what the likely benefits to both parties might be.  This thesis 
intends to contribute to the understanding of China’s trade and investment in Africa, 
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including policy changes that are likely to facilitate the signing of FTAs between China and 
Africa.   
1.6:  Methodology 
1.6.1: Data 
The data for this thesis will be sourced from: 
(i) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Database on FTAs; and 
(ii)  Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
The FTA database tracks and provides a comprehensive listing of bilateral and multilateral 
FTAs. The ADB has 48 regional members including China. The ADB lists all agreements at 
all stages of development, from those under study or consultation to those in force. A key 
feature of all these databases is that they are publicly available. 
1.6.2  Research Methods 
The main research method used is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method (Ragin 
1987). Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a case-oriented method with a substantive 
qualitative element, suitable for the comparison of a small number (N<10) of cases. This 
method will be followed to: 
(i) understand the factors that enhance the formation of FTAs, particularly with 
respect to recent FTAs between China and countries in Asia, Latin America and 
Oceania; 
(ii) understand whether these factors are present in the context of African countries; 
(iii)  understand the extent to which these factors may enhance FTAs between China 
and Africa and the form of such FTAs; and 
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(iv)  understand the constraints facing potential FTAs between China and African 
countries. 
The causal role of each of the identified factors will be examined in combination with other 
factors. Also, this method takes into account the possibility that the formation of FTAs may 
have a different explanation than their non-occurrence. Thus, it will be possible to allow for 
different, mutually non-exclusive explanations of the existing FTAs between China and other 
countries, and the prospects of such developing in the future. Additionally, analysis will be 
based on three countries in Africa, namely: Nigeria, Sudan, and South Africa. While data 
presented in this Chapter so far has been for the continent of Africa as a whole, the thesis will 
focus on the three African countries identified for in-depth analysis. 
These three countries have been selected using four criteria. The first criterion is resource 
endowment; these three countries are endowed with resources that are of interest to China. 
The second criterion is recent trade volume; the volume of trade between China and each of 
the three countries has been at least US$10 billion per year in the last 5 years. The third 
criterion is geographical balance; the three countries selected for this study are representative 
of key regions in Africa. Nigeria is selected for West Africa, South Africa represents the 
Southern Africa region and Sudan is representing East and North Africa. Fourthly, the three 
countries have market potential for Chinese goods because of their population size and 
location.    
1.7 Thesis Statement 
This thesis argues that the prospects for China signing FTAs with any Africa countries are 
slim in the near future. This conclusion is reached because although some countries meet 
some of the conditions necessary to be a FTA partner with China, there are two significant 
factors holding back China-Africa FTAs. These factors are (i) the low overall priority 
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accorded to Africa in Chinese economic relationships, and (ii) the hesitancy of African 
countries to open up their manufacturing sectors to unfettered Chinese competition.   
1.8 Guide to Thesis 
The remaining parts of this study are organised as follows. Chapter Two will provide the 
historical context for China-Africa relations, involving the phases of the relations and reasons 
they have blossomed over the years.  Chapter Three will discuss: Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) in general; the theories for their creation and economic effects; and the reasons for 
their proliferation since the early 1990s. Chapter Four will discuss China’s Free Trade 
Agreements and identify the criteria through which China selects its FTA partners. Chapter 
Five will discuss three sub-Saharan African countries: Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. It 
will determine if the three countries meet the criteria for China’s FTA partner selection. 
Chapter Six will examine the possibility of China signing FTAs with these three African 
countries, and which country, if any, out of the three might be a likely country with which 
China will first sign a FTA.  The study will then be concluded.   
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Chapter Two 
China’s History in Africa 
2.1 Understanding China-Africa Relations 
Modern China-Africa relations began shortly after the Bandung Conference in 1955. The 
conference brought together representatives from twenty-nine Asian and African 
governments to discuss peace, the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic 
development, and decolonisation. In 1956, Egypt became the first African country to 
establish diplomatic ties with China, because of Egypt’s historic prestige and influence 
(Large 2008, 45).   
Over the years, China-Africa relations have been fluid. During the early years, the 
relationship was largely defined by attempts to thwart the growing profile of the United 
States and the Soviet Union in Africa and to advance Chinese efforts to neutralise its conflicts 
with the Soviet Union (Zheng 2010).  At the time, China considered itself to be the de facto 
leader of the Third World countries. This belief necessitated treating African countries as 
natural allies, while China struggled against Western imperialism and Soviet revisionism 
(ibid).  
In order to properly contextualise China’s history in Africa, this chapter will categorise 
China-Africa engagement into historical phases. The chapter will also dwell on the motives 
that influenced each of the phases, emphasising the implications of the engagement for both 
China and African countries. Moreover, the chapter will discuss the reasons why the 
relationship, which started from both political and ideological considerations, later gravitated 
to include economic and diplomatic considerations. Given the dominance of commerce in 
recent relations, the chapter will also explain the key driver behind China’s economic 
interests in Africa.  
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2.2 Phases in China-Africa Relations 
China-Africa relations can be divided into three phases (Sun 2014). The first phase, between 
1955 and 1979, was characterised by China’s interest in furthering the realisation of its 
political agenda. The nature of Chinese projects was influenced by ideological motivation 
and political expediency. The economic effectiveness and commercial viability of the 
projects were not crucial in the decisions made by Chinese officials (Wenping 2007, 32). 
Political relations between China and Africa reached a milestone between 1963 and 1964, 
when Chinese premier Zhou Enlai19 visited 10 African countries.20 The key issues discussed 
during the visit suggested it was partly informed by Chinese officials’ realisation that 
diplomatic relations must also be complemented and consolidated through political relations. 
The latter was deemed necessary to open the door to other areas of cooperation, such as trade 
relations (Rotberg 2009). Issues that were central to the 10-nation tour revolved around 
China’s interest in promoting friendlier relations with African countries through opposing 
imperialism, colonialism, racism, and strengthening unity among African countries (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2014). These issues formed the basis upon which many African countries 
later forged relations with China.  China had limited success over these issues. At best, these 
issues can be considered ambitious. This is largely because a number of African countries, 
such as South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), were faced with racial segregation.   
During this phase, China’s primary goals were diplomatic and political recognition from 
African countries, as well as the establishment of official ties to solidify the political 
legitimacy of the communist regime (Sun 2014, 4). China’s engagement with Africa has 
largely been shaped by its anti-Western, anti-Soviet Union, and anti-Taiwanese thrust 
                                       
19 Zhou Enlai was the first Premier of the People's Republic of China, serving from October 1949 
until his death in January 1976. 
20 Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. 
 23 
 
(Konings 2007). The key aspect of China’s political and diplomatic relations with Africa 
related to Chinese efforts to end Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in Africa and the cessation of 
official recognition of Taiwan. The Chinese subsequently encouraged African countries to 
embrace the “One China Policy,” which recognised Beijing as the official representative of 
China (Wenping 2007, 5).   
The Chinese diplomatic and political offensive to deny recognition of Taiwan paid off, 
considering the number of African countries that had ties with Taiwan. The aim of isolating 
Taiwan, which dominated relations with Africa in this phase, has been a constant aim during 
subsequent phases as well. In fact, out of more than 50 countries in Africa, only three 
countries in Africa still have ties with Taiwan.21 These countries are small. They do not have 
significant influence within Africa. Other, more influential African countries severed 
relations with Taiwan. For example, South Africa cut ties with Taiwan;22 Malawi and the 
Gambia also ended relations with Taiwan (Tiezzi 2013).  
However, the second phase, between 1979 and the mid-1990s, showed a shift from a purely 
political relationship to a relationship supporting reforms that aided Chinese domestic 
economic development. The period marked a gradual adjustment of China’s priorities for its 
economic development. The reforms were necessitated by a number of factors. Despite the 
fact that China was trying to court African countries in the beginning through the provision of 
aid and technical assistance, China was a poor country with about 250 million people in 
poverty (National Bureau of Statistics 2004). The only way to tackle poverty was through 
sustained economic growth and institutional reforms in China. What may have influenced 
China to pursue economic growth and domestic reforms could be the realisation among 
                                       
21 Burkina Faso, Swaziland and Sao Tome and Principe.  
22 South Africa cut ties with Taiwan in January 1998. 
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Chinese policymakers that playing the role of self-assigned leader of Third World countries 
could be illusory in the face of mass poverty and stagnant economic growth. Attention was 
then shifted to countries that could invest in China to address mass poverty and promote 
economic growth.  
To achieve this, the key strategy was to reposition China’s domestic economy and shift from 
a planned economy to market-oriented reforms (Zheng 2010, 272). Given these goals, Africa 
was not particularly relevant. This led to a decline in China-Africa relations in the 1980s. The 
reforms compelled China to turn to countries in the West for the needed FDI (Taylor 1998, 
444-445). Trade, investment and diplomatic relations with Africa during this period 
stagnated; this was mainly because African countries were not seen as potential partners of 
any commercial value, considering the nature of Chinese economic policy. A lack of interest 
in Africa reflected significantly in both trade and political China-Africa relations (Taylor 
1998, 445). Taylor (1998) argues that trade between China and Africa stagnated and that 
China’s exports to the continent declined by 61 percent during this period. The decline in 
political relations was also reflected in the absence of high-level visits from China to Africa 
in the 1980s. The phase also witnessed the “Democracy Movement” in China in 1989. China 
was determined to quell the movement by employing various methods, which led to the 
killings of demonstrators (mostly students) at Tiananmen Square (ibid). China’s relationships 
with Western countries suffered a setback over the incident. As a result, Western countries 
campaigned to internationally isolate China and introduced economic sanctions against China 
(ibid). 
The isolation and economic sanctions against China marked a significant turning point in 
China-Africa relations. Global pressure against China forced the Chinese government to turn 
to African countries to cushion the effects of the economic sanctions. It also embarked on 
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efforts to renew and widen its contacts, not just in Africa, but also in various developing 
countries (ibid). The key reason that China turned to Africa was that African leaders were not 
fiercely criticising China for the suppression of the protests. Taylor argued that Africans 
supported the methods used by the Chinese government because of:   
(1) self-interest of African elites themselves under threats from global 
democratic clamour; (2) solidarity among Third World countries and 
resentment of the western neo-imperialist interference in the affairs of 
fellow developing countries; and (3) the subtle understanding that criticism 
of China could end Chinese development aid (1998, 447).  
The third phase in China-Africa relations started because of the change in China’s political 
dynamic and the coming into power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa 
in 1994. This phase built on the earlier relations and consolidated the gains made in the 
previous phases - particularly during the first phase. Unlike the second phase, the Chinese 
made further inroads into Africa through diplomatic and political engagement. In 1996, 
during a tour of African countries, President Jiang Zemin presented a five-point proposal that 
established the terms of a new relationship with Africa (Alden 2005, 147). The five-point 
proposal was predicated on reliable friendship, sovereignty, equality, non-intervention, and 
mutually beneficial development and international cooperation (ibid). In terms of ideological 
underpinnings, this period was a clear departure from what had earlier characterised China-
Africa relations, particularly in the first phase.   
The present relationship utilises both domestic and international market resources, and Africa 
is emerging as one of the top choices for China’s “Going-Out” strategy (Sun 2014, 6). The 
“Going-Out” strategy has been consolidated with the establishment of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since 2000. The strategy is for the Forum to shape the nature 
and extent of future relations with Africa (Wenping 2007, 36). The establishment of FOCAC 
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has given African leaders and business elite tremendous opportunities in China, which can 
ultimately help in building strategic partnerships.  
China has used three key strategies to cement China-Africa relations during this period: FDI, 
trade and development assistance, and debt cancellation. Each of these strategies will be 
discussed in detail. It is important to highlight how China used FDI to strengthen its relations 
with Africa. The large presence of Chinese firms and products found recently in Africa are 
the direct result of the shift in the FDI, which itself is influenced by the overall foreign 
relations policy of China. In the 1990s, FDI from Western countries to Africa declined by 50 
percent (Edoho 2011, 108). The entire inflow to the continent was slightly higher than the 
inflow of Western FDI into Portugal in the same period (ibid). China capitalised on the 
vacuum created by declining FDI from Western countries to re-launch itself into the 
continent. Spurred by Africa’s need for growth, African governments approved investments 
from China (Alden 2005, 153). This trend is also reflected in the number of firms approved 
by the Chinese government to invest in Africa, from 602 in 2003 to 715 firms by the end of 
2004 (Edoho 2011, 116).  There was also an increase in Chinese FDI from $5 million in 1999 
to over $50 billion in 2010 (ibid). Haroz (2011) identifies some factors that explain the 
sudden increase. First, many of the firms aiming to start up development projects in Africa 
have gained considerable experience about local markets and can leverage that knowledge to 
make future investments. Linked to this is China’s joining of the World Bank and African 
Development Bank. The combined effect makes it possible for China to bid for projects 
financed by these institutions. This further quickens the pace of its engagement in Africa 
(Haroz 2011, 67).   
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Second, as previously noted, many Chinese apparel manufacturers established processing 
factories in Africa to increase their sales by circumventing rules of origin (ROOs),23 which is 
used as a trade restriction in the West (Gu 2009, 571). By establishing in Africa, Chinese 
apparel manufacturers increase their markets. Thirdly, Africa is endowed with abundant raw 
materials. Locating factories in the region will help in accessing the raw materials market 
easily and cheaply (ibid). The China Export-Import Bank has been a virile instrument not 
only to boost trade and investment, but also to enhance Chinese influence abroad by giving 
export credit, international guarantees, loans for overseas construction and investment, as 
well as official lines of credit (Moss and Rose 2006, 1). 
The history of China in Africa is characterised by development assistance to several African 
governments. One form of development assistance was debt cancellation offered to 31 
African countries, which totaled $1.27 billion (Alden 2005, 151). There is a constant theme 
in Chinese overseas development assistance; China maintains that its development assistance 
is without condition. However, there is one overriding political condition attached to 
obtaining China’s development assistance. The condition has to do with the “One China 
Policy.” By cancelling these debts, China has placed itself on a similar footing to Western 
countries, which have similarly used debt cancellation to gain favour with leaders from the 
continent (ibid). However, many are eager to point out that one of the key intentions of China 
in Africa is to outcompete and possibly whittle down Western influence in Africa (Edoho 
2011, 108). According to Konings (2007), China’s aid is also more appealing to African 
leaders because it is devoid of conditionality on good governance and fiscal probity.  
                                       
23 Rules of origin are the criteria needed to determine the national source of a product. Their 
importance is derived from the fact that duties and restrictions in several cases depend upon the 
source of imports. 
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As it has been discussed above, China has used FDI and development assistance, including 
debt cancellation and trade, to strengthen its relationship with Africa. It is equally important 
to also inquire into China’s motives in Africa. Understanding what the motives are will help 
in clarifying the key drivers of Chinese interests in Africa. 
2.3 China’s Motives in Africa 
There have been debates about China’s motives in Africa.  A commonly held view is that 
China is driven by its interest in African natural resources and by the possibility of enjoying a 
pliable system where China can undercut global standards, such as compliance with 
environmental laws and respect for human rights. It is therefore important to discuss the 
motives for increased China-Africa relations, and the factors that have encouraged African 
countries to engage with China.  Alden (2005) itemises four factors that are the hallmarks of 
China’s African policy: energy security; new markets and investment opportunities; 
development; and the establishment of strategic partnerships.  Zweig and Jianhai (2005) are 
of the view that China’s African relations are largely driven by China’s domestic 
development strategy.  First, China wants access to energy resources. Second, the Chinese 
want to establish export markets for their finished products.  Broadman (2007) also argues 
that the key driver of China-Africa relations is China’s blossoming economy, which requires 
new markets and ultimately leads to an increase in trade, investment, and joint enterprises 
between China and many African countries.  
The inference, therefore, is that China’s main motive in Africa is economic expansion.  China 
sees opportunities in Africa. These opportunities motivate China to deepen its relationship.  
The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Government of China 
2000a) and Programme for China-Africa Cooperation on Economic and Social Development 
(Government of China 2000b) both give detailed insight into whether China’s interest in 
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Africa is resource driven. The two documents are suggestive that Chinese motives for forging 
a strategic partnership with Africa are largely economic; the availability of raw materials, 
new markets, and investment opportunities are all of vital interest to China’s economic 
growth (Konings 2007, 350-351).   
There are indications that China’s demand for crude oil will increase. The International 
Energy Agency24 (IEA) has projected that China’s oil demand will increase to 13.1 million 
barrels per day in 2030; this is up from 3.5 million per day in 2006 (Hanson 2008, 1). Africa 
is one of the places from which China will source its energy needs. The increase in demand 
for crude oil has led China to negotiate oil deals with some oil producing countries – Nigeria, 
Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan – in exchange for providing infrastructure 
(ibid).  In 2006, for example, the Nigerian government granted oil-drilling licenses to China 
in exchange for an investment worth $4 billion in infrastructure. The same deal was sealed in 
Angola in 2004 when China offered a loan for infrastructure that included roads, railroads, 
and telecommunications (Edoho 2011, 118).   
Another motive for China-Africa engagement is the economic value of various markets and 
investment opportunities in Africa. The liberalisation of a once protected market ultimately 
opened the door to increased economic activities from other players, including Chinese firms.  
The expansion of markets was made possible through a series of reforms initiated in many 
African countries. Also, the large population in African countries is seen as a potential 
market for Chinese products. While Chinese growth relies heavily on the manufacturing 
sector, it needs a new and dependable consumers’ market to sustain its steep developmental 
trajectory (Haroz 2011, 72).  Africa has emerged as one of the perfect markets for China.  
                                       
24 The IEA is an autonomous organisation which works to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy 
for its 29 member countries and beyond. 
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With respect to strategic interests, China’s motive in Africa has much to do with burnishing 
its credentials in the global balance of power. According to Wenping (2007), increased 
China-Africa relations will help raise China’s own international influence. By reaching out to 
African countries, China intends to project the image of a global super-power and to 
demonstrate that it can also compete on the world stage with the US and the EU countries 
(Haroz 2011, 72). China’s engagement in Africa has been shaped by reliance on diplomatic 
supports and cooperation from African countries on key issues, not only in the international 
sphere, but also in multilateral fora (Sun 2014, 4). For instance, China and Africa have united 
to fight for fair and equitable international economic trade rules under the WTO’s 
negotiations over agricultural issues (Wenping 2007, 27). 
Kopinski et al. (2011, 129) argue that China has risen from being a backward country to 
record a staggering economic growth without adopting Western-oriented policy prescriptions. 
Large numbers of African countries perceive Chinese growth as a development alternative 
that may be suitable for African countries, given the failures of the Western policy 
prescriptions, such as the Structural Adjustment Programme25 (SAP) and austerity 
measures.26 African countries are also motivated by the example set by China regarding: its 
identification with poor countries, its demand for equality and justice within the world 
system, and its financial and technical support (Mawdsley 2007, 410). Another key reason for 
Africa’s interest is known as the “Beijing Consensus.”27 In Ramo’s (2004) terms, this 
consensus incorporates a new attitude towards politics, development, and the global balance 
                                       
25 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) consists of loans provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to countries that experienced economic crises. 
26 Austerity measures are official actions taken by the government, during a period of adverse 
economic conditions, to reduce its budget deficit using a combination of spending cuts or tax rises. 
27The Beijing Consensus is the political and especially economic policies of the People's Republic of 
China that began after the death of Mao Zedong and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping (1976) and 
are thought to have contributed to China's eightfold growth in gross national product over two 
decades. 
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of power. In general, the terms describe the present international political order and conclude 
the order is unjust and inequitable; given this situation, is skewed against developing 
countries through a number of policies. The “Beijing Consensus” counteracts these policies 
by: (a) urging South-South economic cooperation with mutual benefits; (b) rejecting of 
meddlesomeness in the internal affairs of countries, and (c) prioritising a commitment to 
peaceful multilateralism, and pursuing the peaceful negotiation of international disputes as 
well as nuclear non-proliferation (Mawdsley 2007, 413). This approach contrasts with the 
Washington Consensus,28 which emphasises democracy, good governance, and poverty 
reduction. The Washington Consensus policy prescriptions are often imposed on developing 
countries without considering the ability of developing countries to comply with the policies.  
Therefore, with the Beijing Consensus, the lack of conditionality and insistence on 
sovereignty are more appealing to African leaders (ibid, 415).  It should be noted that the key 
elements of the Beijing Consensus have continued to evolve over the years. For instance, 
China has revisited its policy on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries 
because of the criticism that has characterised its stance on human rights abuse in Sudan. It 
has altered its long-standing policy of blocking the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
peacekeeping deployment by authorising peacekeepers for Darfur in Sudan (Hanson 2008, 3). 
China realises that it needs to interfere in certain situations. According to Zhengyu and 
Taylor, such interferences are subject to certain conditions:  
(a) the intervening bodies must first proceed with respect for the concerned state’s 
sovereignty; (b) there must be authorisation from the UN; (c) they must receive an 
                                       
28 The Washington Consensus is a set of 10 economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute the 
"standard" reform package promoted for crisis-ridden developing countries by Washington, D.C. 
based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury 
Department. 
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invitation from the state concerned; and (d) force should be used when all other 
options have been explored (2011, 138).  
These conditions deviate from the earlier principle of total non-interference. However, the 
practicality of these conditions suggests China still abhors political interference and may not 
likely interfere. Generally, China has proven to be Africa’s valuable partner. The pace of 
engagement between China and Africa is unprecedented. It is important to scrutinise the 
engagement to determine if it is a “win-win situation” or not. If all parties benefit from the 
economic collaboration, it will definitely make the engagement more sustainable and 
beneficial.  
It is evident that the level of China-Africa engagement has been in three phases; China’s 
national interests define each of the phases. There is an improvement in the relationships 
during the third phase because China needs African countries in order to accomplish part of 
its economic and political agenda. It is not surprising that China has aligned with Africa to 
ensure that multilateral organisations, such as the WTO and the UN, are fair to African 
countries. The next chapter will explore the nature and potential of this relationship further by 
discussing an important trade framework: FTAs. 
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Chapter 3  
Free Trade Agreements 
3.1 Introduction  
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, the world’s political leaders met to plan out an 
institutional framework that would prevent the re-occurrence of a similar outbreak of war. 
Part of the framework was the creation of an international economic system. The economic 
system was aimed at curtailing predatory and mercantilist trade practices, which 
characterised the world before the outbreak of the war. The economic institutional framework 
that emerged was known as the Bretton Woods System.29 It was comprised of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and GATT (Jackson 1993).  
In the context of this global economic system this chapter will outline the general evolution 
of FTAs. In doing this, it will explore all associated global, bilateral and multilateral trade 
frameworks. The chapter will therefore examine the GATT and the WTO. It will explore if 
both organisations have brought about a robust multilateral trading system, or undermined it; 
this will include a discussion of the likely causes. The chapter will also examine the 
underlining causes of FTAs, concerning whether they deviate from the multilateral principle 
of non-discrimination, or whether they divert or create trade. The chapter will further 
consider the reasons behind the proliferation of FTAs, as well as the motivation for countries 
perception of FTAs as alternatives to multilateral trade under the WTO. This chapter will also 
discuss the Rules of origin (ROOs), one of the inherent parts of FTAs. It will also analyse to 
                                       
29 The Bretton Woods System was developed at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference held in 1944. Under the agreement, currencies were pegged to the price of gold, and the 
U.S. dollar was seen as a reserve currency linked to the price of gold.  
 
 
 
 34 
 
see if the ROOs are a protectionist tool that undermines multilateralism or encourages it.  
Also, given the nature of FTAs, the chapter will give possible explanation for the signing of 
FTAs by many countries. The next section will give an overview of the evolution of FTAs 
and the reason they have become an acceptable trade framework among many countries. 
3.2 Evolution of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
In 1947, 23 countries signed the GATT. The GATT came into existence as a result of the 
inability of negotiating countries to create the International Trade Organization (ITO). The 
GATT was envisaged as a multilateral agreement regulating international trade (Trakman 
2008). The key goals of GATT were the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the 
elimination of preferences on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. The goals also 
included the unification of multilateral trade practices through commonly understood sets of 
principles directed at harmonising trade practices and cooperation in the global interest 
(Trakman 2008, 3).  The world leaders’ adherence to an open multilateral trading system 
became a key-underpinning factor for the post-Second World War international economic 
order. The first principle related to non-discrimination. This was the cornerstone of the 
GATT provision and required unconditional extension of Most Favoured Nation30 (MFN) 
treatment to all GATT members (Bhagwati 1992, 536). The MFN is a treatment given by one 
country to another in the global trade. It simply means the promising country may not treat a 
country that has been accorded MFN status less advantageously than any other country with 
MFN status. The second principle relates to the balanced, mutual and reciprocal concessions 
as the appropriate way to achieve multilateral trade (ibid). Reciprocal concessions were 
meant to discourage the aggressive use of power to extract unwarranted trade concessions. 
                                       
30 A Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause is a level of status given to one country by another and 
enforced by the World Trade Organization. Countries achieving most favored nation status are given 
specific trade advantages, such as reduced tariffs on imported goods. 
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That means the GATT was to ensure a “level playing field” for all member states. Despite the 
goals of GATT, there were limitations in bringing about a non-discriminatory trading system.  
The GATT met its goals within the first three decades of its existence. World trade gravitated 
toward multilateral free trade with little interest in customs unions31 or preferential trading 
agreements (PTA) (Krueger 1999, 106). While the GATT achieved some progress toward 
attaining a non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, there were several problems that 
led many countries to be frustrated with the GATT. Bhagwati (1990) argues the GATT itself 
allowed for a departure from MFN. The GATT allowed countervailing duties against foreign 
subsidies and anti-dumping measures. Anti-dumping measures were aimed only at the 
offending parties. Within it, developing countries got Special and Differential treatment, such 
as lower tariffs than developed GATT member countries. Also, the GATT dispute settlement 
system and its institutional structure were inadequate for many new developments (Jackson, 
1993, 124).  For instance, the GATT mainly covered tariffs but neglected other non-tariff 
measures.  
The world of global trade moved to a period whereby countries in the developing world were 
seeking a wider participation in global trade. The urge for a wider participation was triggered 
by the increasing wave of globalisation, deregulation, and privatisation of national industries 
in developing countries. Developing countries resented the idea that developed countries 
were key decision makers in the GATT (Fergusson 2008, 1). These developments 
necessitated many countries to seek an alternative multilateral platform for global trade that 
would not only address tariffs and other issues not covered under the GATT, but also 
                                       
31 Customs Union is a group of countries that have agreed to charge the same import duties as each 
other and usually to allow free trade between themselves. 
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incorporate developing countries into the decision-making process for the future of world 
trade policies. This led to the commencement of the Uruguay Round32 in 1986 (ibid).  
The Uruguay Round was meant to expand the competence of the GATT to important new 
areas, such as services, capital, intellectual property, textiles, and agriculture. The Round 
started in 1986 with 123 countries. This collaboration was the first set of multilateral trade 
negotiations in which developing countries played an active role. The issues covered under 
the Round included: tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property rights, 
dispute settlement, textiles, and agriculture. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round ultimately 
led to the creation of the WTO (Wilkinson 2010, 129). Both the GATT and WTO had created 
a strong, international trading system, which contributed to unprecedented global economic 
growth. The WTO currently has 161 members, of which 117 are developing countries (WTO 
2015a).  
The first WTO Ministerial Conference33 was held in Singapore in 1996. The Ministerial 
Conference arrived at four non-tariff issues: transparency in government procurement; trade 
facilitation; trade investment; and trade and competition (Fergusson 2008, 19). These four 
issues are referred to as the Singapore issues (ibid). The subsequent trade negotiation round 
under the WTO was the Doha Round. The Doha Round34 was launched mainly to address the 
perceived marginalisation of many developing countries in the previous rounds. Developing 
countries insisted that previous trade negotiation rounds failed to address their interests 
(Wilkinson 2010, 138). The Doha Round was a multilateral trade negotiation that was 
                                       
32 The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) conducted within 
the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), spanning from 1986 to 1994 
and embracing 123 countries as "contracting parties." 
33 The top decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which usually meets 
every two years. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the 
multilateral trade agreements. 
34 The Doha Round is the latest trade-negotiation round of the WTO which started in November 2001. 
Its objective was to lower trade barriers around the world. 
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designed to help the world economy, which had been weakened by recession and security 
challenges across the world in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (Fergusson 2008, 2). 
This was evident because the growth in the volume of the world merchandise trade had 
slowed down to 2 percent in 2001 compared to 12 percent in 2000 (Wilkinson 2010).  
In recent years, trade talks under the WTO have been in limbo. There are concerns that the 
envisaged global trade liberalisation, as outlined under the WTO, might be illusory. The pace 
at which regional FTAs are negotiated and signed reinforces this assertion. The United States 
(US) has been the main driving force for FTAs, and a key defender of multilateralism 
through the post war years. The US had earlier abstained from Article XXIV35 of GATT 
(Bhagwati 1992, 540). The first US action was to extend unilateral trade preferences to some 
Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Initiative in 1983 (Krueger 1999, 108). This was 
followed by a FTA with Israel in 1986. The US and Canada began talks which led to the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989. Mexico later joined this negotiation 
and ultimately signed the North American Free Trade Agreement36 (NAFTA) with Canada 
and the US in 1994 (ibid).  The wave of regional FTAs has led many to question if regional 
trade agreements will lead to non-discriminatory multilateral free trade, or if they will further 
fragment the world’s economy. As it will be discussed throughout this chapter, many 
countries have signed FTAs. This has also led to the proliferation of FTAs in different parts 
of the world. It is also necessary to inquire into the reasons for which many countries, in 
recent history, have signed FTAs. 
                                       
35 Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides an important 
exception to Article I (most favoured nation clause) by permitting countries to enter into Customs 
Union or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
36 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) creates one of the world's largest free trade 
zones and laying the foundations for strong economic growth and rising prosperity for Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico. 
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3.3 Why do Countries Prefer FTAs? 
There are several factors that can be adduced for the increasing wave of FTAs and why some 
countries have signed them.  These factors may be general or specific. One of the general 
factors is the absence of progress in the conclusion of the Doha Round under the WTO. Many 
feel that the WTO has failed. Many countries see FTAs as the vehicle through which they can 
press ahead with their trade and liberalisation agenda. This aligns with tremendous economic 
growth in Asia and the signing of several FTAs within the region, which contributes to this 
growth. The US trade policies in the 1990s favoured FTAs and were seen by other countries 
as a means to carry the trade agenda forward (Bergsten 1996).   
Menon (2009) and Woolcock (2007) both argue that FTAs are largely driven by political 
considerations as well as security concerns. According to Woolcock (ibid, 3), the Europe 
Agreements37 negotiated with the central and eastern European countries after 1990 were 
mainly driven by a desire to create a stable post-Cold War political order. In addition, the 
Euro-Med Association Agreements38 with EU’s southern neighbours were negotiated for 
political stability to tackle causes of religious fundamentalism. Many countries also join 
FTAs because negotiating FTAs are quicker, more efficient, and more certain than 
multilateral negotiations. However, some FTAs require tremendous time to negotiate. Some 
FTAs can take the same length of time to negotiate as multilateral agreements. For example, 
it took a decade to negotiate NAFTA, which comprises just three countries: Canada, United 
States, and Mexico. The Uruguay Round, involving 115 nations negotiating a large range of 
issues, took seven years (Bhagwati 1995, 13).   
                                       
37 The Europe agreements were association agreements between the EU and its Member States and 
the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004/2007. 
38 The European Union (EU) concluded Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between 1998 
and 2005 with seven countries in the southern Mediterranean. These agreements effectively provide a 
suitable framework for North-South political dialogue. They also serve as a basis for the gradual 
liberalisation of trade in the Mediterranean area, and set out the conditions for economic, social and 
cultural cooperation between the EU and each partner country. 
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Commercial motivation is another specific reason contributing to the signing of FTAs. Again, 
Woolcock (2007, 3) categorises the commercial motivation into three broad areas, namely: 
(a) neutralising a potential trade diversion resulting from FTAs between Third World 
countries; (b) forging strategic links with countries or regions experiencing rapid economic 
growth; and (c) enforcement of international trade rules. With respect to neutralising trade 
diversion, the EU and Mexico FTA is instructive.  The EU and Mexico FTA agreement was 
negotiated and concluded after NAFTA was signed, which reduced EU trade with Mexico. 
The EU-Mexico agreement was aimed at neutralising trade diversion (ibid). Solidifying 
strategic links was the key motivating factor for EU-FTA with the Southern Common 
Market39 (MERCOSUR). Countries also sign FTAs, in part, to strengthen the implementation 
of agreed international trade rules, such as intellectual property rights protection (ibid). It is 
argued that the growth of FTAs can also be attributed to the tendency for FTAs to attract less 
attention from the media, domestic opposition forces, or anti-free trade lobby compared to 
multilateral negotiations. This relieves FTAs of the pressure and protests that usually 
accompany multilateral negotiations, like those witnessed during the WTO ministerial 
meeting in Seattle in 1999 (Menon 2007, 32). All these factors facilitate the speed at which 
FTAs can be negotiated and signed. The number of FTAs has continued to increase among 
various countries in different parts of the world.  
3.4 Proliferation of FTAs 
In the early 1980s FTAs emerged; accordingly in the 1990s, the practice of creating these 
agreements increased considerably among countries in different parts of the world (Pomfret 
2007, 924). In 2005, the GATT/WTO had been notified of 312 Regional Trade Agreements40 
                                       
39 MERCOSUR comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
40 In the WTO, regional trade agreements (RTAs) are defined as reciprocal trade agreements between 
two or more partners. They include free trade agreements and customs unions. 
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(RTAs). Out of this, 196 of the RTAs were signed after the establishment of the WTO in 
1996 (ibid). As of April 2015, 612 notifications of RTAs had been received by the 
GATT/WTO (WTO 2015a). Of these, 406 were in force. These WTO figures correspond to 
449 physical RTAs (counting goods, services, and accessions together), of which 262 are 
currently in force (WTO 2015b).  Before the current wave of RTAs, many countries in East 
Asia relied more on non-discriminatory unilateral and multilateral liberalisation. Within the 
last decade, many countries in Asia have been catching up with RTAs. This has largely taken 
the form of bilateral FTAs rather than multilateral or regional negotiations (Sally 2006, 307). 
According to Sally (2006), all major regional powers41 in Asia are involved. At present, there 
are 147 FTAs signed and in effect involving at least one Asian country as a partner. 
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), there are 14 FTAs signed, but not yet in 
effect; finally, 62 FTA negotiations are launched, which also involve at least one Asian 
country as a partner (ADB 2015).  
FTAs have been especially popular in the Americas.  Chile alone has 21 agreements with 58 
countries, covering 92.5 percent of all merchandise exports, and giving its products 
preferential access to 4.2 billion potential customers (Perales 2012). Cumulatively, Latin 
American countries have signed a total of 65 trade agreements. Notably, 54 of these 
agreements have been negotiated with other developing countries, within and outside of the 
region, and 11 of the agreements involve developed countries (Rodríguez-Mendoza 2012). Of 
all the major economic powers, only the EU has remained outside of the fray of FTAs in Asia 
(Sen 2006).  In October 2015, 12 countries signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership42 (TPP): the 
United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
                                       
41 China, Japan, South Korea, India, Hong Kong and South Asian countries. 
42 The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States (until 23 January 2017) 
and Vietnam. 
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Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. However, this has since been revoked as a result of 
the US withdrawing, following the election of Donald Trump as President of the US in 2016.  
Generally, a FTA is good and countries, irrespective of their geographical locations, can sign 
a FTA with each other.  Krueger (1997a) argues that there is nothing to suggest that the gains 
from a FTA will be more likely to be positive among neighbours versus another group of 
countries. Earlier FTAs did not focus heavily on neighbouring countries (Krueger 1999, 174). 
For example, the FTA between the US and Israel, as well as the United States-Singapore 
FTA, were not signed by countries in the same geographical location. Confining FTA 
members to a certain geographical location will make FTAs more exclusive and less open to 
new members.  
3.5 Theory of FTAs 
The underlying theory behind FTAs is that they lower trade barriers between member 
countries. Viner (1950) argues that having a FTA between two or more countries does not 
necessarily result in economic gains for all the members. According to Viner (ibid), FTAs 
can result in trade creation and ultimately increase national welfare. FTAs can also lead to 
trade diversion and, by implication, reduce national welfare. Krueger (1997a) argues that 
trade creation takes place when a country’s domestic production of an item falls and is 
replaced by lower-cost production from a partner country. This occurs because importing the 
goods is cheaper than producing them at home. Trade diversion takes place when a member 
country replaces imports from the rest of the world with imports from the higher-cost partner 
(Krueger 1997b, 175). This means FTAs do not necessarily result in gains for participating 
countries unless trade creation effects outweigh trade diversion effects.  
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There is a general view that free trade is good for the parties involved. This means any move 
toward free trade should be welcome. As Krugman (1991) argues, this is not the case.  
Krugman offers three inherent problems usually associated with FTAs:  
(i) trade liberalisation among a subset of countries may create perverse 
incentives that lead to specialisation towards the wrong direction; (ii) a 
FTA may hurt countries outside those areas; and (iii) it has the tendency 
to lead to trade warfare, whereby regional trading blocs will have more 
market power in the world trade, thus tempting them to engage in more 
aggressive trade policies that may damage trade between blocs and may 
eventually leave everyone worse off (Krugman 1991, 7).  
Trakman argues that:  
(i) FTAs can cause trade to contract, not expand. This occurs when the net 
creation of trade arising from FTAs is offset by the net diversion of trade 
away from non-parties. (ii) FTAs can produce negative trade distortions 
particularly when trade in agriculture is diverted from developing to 
developed states and (iii) FTAs may lead to there being more, but not 
necessarily better, results (2008, 14-15). 
To unleash the potential trade creation of FTAs, they should increase competition in 
previously protected markets. The essence of international trade is to expand competition 
within the domestic economy and increase markets abroad for domestic producers (Griswold 
2003, 4). On the other hand, if a FTA does not have an effect in the reduction of prices for the 
importing country but simply reshuffles imports from the rest of the world to a FTA partner, 
the importing country can suffer a welfare loss (Griswold 2003, 4). This loss comes in the 
form of revenue loss for government, and consumers are unable to reap any gain from lower 
prices. The likely outcome of these effects is that the importing country’s treasury subsidises 
less efficient production in the partner country (ibid). Again, if diverted demand causes the 
global prices outside of the FTA to fall, the rest of the world loses from lost producer surplus.  
To prevent a situation of trade diversion and maximise the benefit of FTAs, FTA member 
countries should allow large and competitive foreign producers to displace domestic 
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producers in a large and protected market (ibid). This has the advantage of delivering lower 
prices and higher real incomes to workers and families, which is ultimately one of the key 
reasons for a FTA. The worst aspect of trade diversion is that it allows less competitive 
foreign producers to replace more competitive foreign producers in a large and protected 
domestic market. This depletes tariff revenue while at the same time fails to bring about 
lower domestic prices or more efficient domestic production (ibid). 
A FTA, therefore, can take many forms. It can involve a total duty reduction, as well as the 
commodity covered, under the arrangement (Krueger 1997b, 173). The arrangement can also 
be partial, such as a 50 percent duty reduction (ibid). The general assumptions in favour of 
FTAs are that countries and their citizens can buy more and sell more under the FTA, which 
ultimately would result in improved standards of living.  
3.6 FTAs and Customs Union 
The principle of non-discrimination under the GATT allows for the extension of MFN 
treatment to all GATT members. According to Bhagwati (1992), a FTA is one of the 
exceptions to MFN, as enshrined in the GATT article XXIV. From the view-point of 
regionalism, Article XXIV of the GATT approves free trade areas and customs unions. 
According to Krueger (1999, 111) a customs union is a preferential trading arrangement in 
which all tariffs among members are eliminated while external tariffs are adjusted to a 
common level. In order words, a customs union is an arrangement in which there is zero duty 
among members on imports of goods and a common external tariff.  For a customs union to 
be consistent with GATT/WTO rules, Krueger (ibid) further argues that the external tariffs 
must not, on average, be higher than the pre-union tariff. Bhagwati (1992, 537) asserts that a 
customs union with 100 percent preferences creates a wider trading area and removes more 
barriers to competition than a customs union that is less than 100 percent. Given the 
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possibility of creating a wider area, Bhagwati (ibid) further argues that a customs union is 
more conducive to the expansion of trade based on multilateralism and non-discrimination, 
and a preferential system based on a FTA is not conducive to the expansion of trading areas.   
The key difference between a customs union and a FTA is that FTA members may differ in 
the trade barriers they impose on non-members (Krueger 1999, 112). Furthermore, unlike the 
overlapping preferential arrangements in an FTA, it is not possible to have an overlapping 
customs union (Krueger 1997a, 11). This has increased the costs of doing business, as well as 
welfare associated with trade diversion, due to inconsistencies between various elements of 
the agreements, such as different ROOs (Menon 2009, 1381). ROOs can create trade barriers 
under a FTA that are not possible under a customs union. This makes the possibility of trade 
diversion more prominent under a FTA than a customs union. Since there is a common 
external tariff, trade diversion is less of a problem (ibid,). Also, arguing on welfare grounds, 
Krueger (1997b, 171) believes that a FTA cannot bring about benefits that are not attainable 
under a customs union, but can generate additional national welfare costs that are not 
incurred under customs unions. As Krueger (1997a, 14) further points out, a customs union 
increases potential national welfare more than a FTA because the ROOs are a unique and 
inherent feature of the FTA.  
3.7 Rules of Origin (ROOs) 
In any FTA negotiation, one of the core issues relates to the ROOs. The ROOs state the 
criteria under which goods imported by one FTA partner will be deemed to have originated 
from within a FTA member country and will be eligible for duty-free treatment. The ROOs 
are negotiated to avoid importation of all goods through the lowest-tariff country (Krueger 
1999, 112). The conditions in which a good can qualify for ROOs can take many forms. 
However, the most commons ones are:  
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(a) the item must change tariff classifications; (b) the item being considered 
must have undergone a tremendous transformation; (c) a specified 
percentage of the item’s sales price must consist of value-added in the 
partner country; and (d) a certain percentage of purchased parts and 
components must be bought from FTA members (Krueger 1993,7).   
This is important in determining the economic effects of ROOs, largely because the 
incentives structure varies with the ROOs alongside the structure of the tariff.  
If the materials excluding labour are considered as proof of establishing 
origin there is an incentive to substitute material. However, if domestic 
labour, excluding capital, is considered in the calculation, the incentive to 
substitute labour for capital is present Krueger (1993, 7).   
This normally raises the question of “how much domestic value added must be in a given 
part, or component, for it to count as domestic?” Krueger (1993) answers this by asserting:  
when domestic value added is the determining factor, the precise criterion 
for attributing capital costs must be specified. While rules of origin are 
agreed on at the inception of forming a FTA, trade partners can extend the 
protection accorded by each country to producers in others FTA members’ 
countries; for example, rules of origin can constitute bias toward economic 
inefficiency in FTAs (Krueger 1993, 8).   
Moreover, the ROOs have the potential to protect one country’s higher cost producers in 
another country’s markets, even in the face of a tariff structure. This may result in lower costs 
of imports from the rest of the world (ibid). Another reason why the FTA is considered a tool 
for protection is because ROOs help producers of higher cost intermediate goods gain access 
to the FTA’s partner markets in preference to lower cost of such goods outside of FTA 
(Krueger 1999, 113). 
Apart from being a tool for protection, ROOs are always subject to controversy. Often, ROOs 
increase producers’ costs. They require watertight administrative surveillance. In addition, 
the implementation and interpretation of the ROOs can impose considerable costs. Herin 
(1986) estimates the cost to European FTA members, with respect to documenting origin; on 
average, 3-5 percent of the price is required to qualify for duty-free entry into the EU. Often 
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producers choose to pay for the duties rather than provide the appropriate documentation to 
establish origin (ibid). At the same time, negotiating ROOs give an opportunity for producers 
to lobby for restrictive ROOs for goods that concern them (Krueger 1999, 112). FTAs, 
therefore, pose management challenges and transaction costs that can potentially affect the 
gains from free trade (ibid). When FTAs exist among countries participating in a commodity 
chain, differences in ROOs may impose additional costs by forcing producers to change their 
supply chains in order to source from a FTA-partner country, or from one where the ROOs 
involve more favourable terms. Generally, ROOs are a protectionist device (Krueger 1993, 
10).  They undermine flow of trade among non-FTA members. In light of the challenges 
associated with FTAs, it is necessary to examine the implications of FTAs vis-à-vis the 
multilateral trading system.  
3.8 Implications of FTAs for the Multilateral Trading System 
There are many FTAs around the world today. It remains unclear if FTAs are compatible 
with multilateral trading systems, or simply undermine them. Some economists have 
maintained that preferential trading agreements threaten open multilateral systems and should 
be limited (Bhagwati 1992). Others have seen FTAs in a positive light as part of a benign 
competitive-liberalisation process and a building block of multilateral liberalisation. As a 
building block, FTAs are seen as steps towards multilateral liberalisation, which will 
strengthen the WTO and the international trading system, rather than undermine it (Ethier 
1998).  
Bhagwati and his co-travellers foresee the possibility of a world of trading blocs with 
relatively high barriers between them, as well as a situation whereby trade diversion becomes 
the norm and outright trade war is always a possibility (Krueger 1999, 119). Levy (1997) also 
contends that bilateral trade agreements can never increase support for multilateral free trade, 
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and are likely to generate the most opposition when the factor of endowments of the partner 
countries are similar. Levy (1997) is further of the view that export interests will provide less 
political support for multilateral liberalisation once they have gained additional market access 
with the preferential trading agreement.  
Economists, led by Bhagwati, therefore, argue that the spread of preferential trading 
agreements is likely to damage the multilateral trading system. Bhagwati (1999) argues that 
FTAs have become a weapon through which powerful countries want to satisfy their multiple 
non-trade demands on weaker trading nations rather than through multilateralism.  
However, economists, lead by Ethier (1998), are of the view that it facilitates steps on the 
path to greater trade liberalisation, notwithstanding the reasons adduced that FTAs undermine 
multilateralism. Ethier sees FTAs as building blocks, vis-à-vis the following:  
(i) regionalism is a means through which new countries trying to enter the 
multilateral system can compete among themselves for direct investment 
that is crucial for their active participation in multilateralism; and (ii) FTAs 
arise as a result of the success of multilateral liberalisation among 
developed countries. Developing countries try to use their trade reforms to 
attract trade. Investment flows from large countries and FTAs play key 
roles in expanding and preserving the liberal trade order, because of the 
successes of multilateral liberalisation (Ethier 1998, 1160).  
Krueger (1999) offers some reasons why some economists think preferential trading 
agreements do not undermine multilateral trade. In part, the reasons are that: 
(a) a preferential agreement is a bargaining threat to encourage multilateral 
trade agreements as exemplified during the Uruguay Round; and (b) 
preferential trading agreement permits member countries to liberalise over 
and beyond what could be achieved under multilateral (Krueger 1999, 118).  
Griswold (2003) therefore argues that FTAs provide institutional competition to keep 
multilateral talks on track. With this, FTA member countries can argue that they have the 
right to find bilateral and regional partners to do so (Griswold 2003, 5).   
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To advance the cause of FTAs as potential building blocks for multilateral liberalisation, the 
concept and practice of ‘open regionalism’ has been promoted.  
3.9 Open Regionalism as a Building Block? 
The concept of open regionalism was introduced at the inception of the Asian Pacific 
Economic Cooperation43 (APEC) in 1989. The APEC is a loosely structured grouping 
without a charter. Its decisions are non-binding on individual members. It is thought to 
embody a structure that minimises trade diversion (Wei and Frankel 1997, 120).   
There has not been an agreed definition for open regionalism. Kelegama (2000, 4525) defines 
open regionalism “as trade liberalisation among member-countries within a region, occurring 
on a MFN basis, and devoid of asking for reciprocity from non-members.” However, 
Bergsten (1997) outlines four definitions of open regionalism based on APEC’s perspectives. 
The first definition is based on open membership. This means any country that indicates a 
credible willingness to accept the rules of the institution is invited to join. Secondly, in the 
conditional MFN definition APEC becomes a preferential trading arrangement, but offers to 
generalise its reductions of barriers to all non-members who agree to take similar steps. It has 
been argued that outsiders would accept the offer to avoid being discriminated against by 
countries that account for half of the world economy. In this regard, Bergsten (ibid) argues 
that if the majority of non-members accept the offer, then APEC liberalisation will take place 
in the WTO and, apparently, represent a multilateral liberalisation. The third definition is 
global liberalisation, in which APEC members continue to reduce their barriers while also 
continuing negotiations with the WTO to influence WTO members to follow APEC’s 
                                       
43 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum established in 1989 
to leverage the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific. The participating APEC economies are: 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic 
of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. 
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agenda. That way, free trade is achieved both regionally and globally. The last definition is 
when APEC concentrates only on deep integration issues and leaves shallow integration 
under the WTO umbrella. In the concept of open regionalism, therefore, liberalisation relies 
on economic self-interests of individual countries, to the extent that open regionalism 
concerns itself with the behaviour of trading partners. In this case, peer-pressure and the 
demonstration effect are key factors encouraging them to follow suit (Garnaut 1994).  
Open regionalism has helped to shape the practice of economic cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region, which has witnessed an emerging reality of regional economic integration in 
the 1970s (Garnaut 1994, 273). Garnaut (ibid) argues, therefore, that the increasingly open 
tendency of East Asian economies in the 1970s was characterised by non-discriminatory 
liberalisation in many cases. This trend expanded opportunities for the profitable intra-
regional trade that brought about the initial discussion of open regionalism. The unilateral 
liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific region fits perfectly into this, largely because it has been 
generating rising trade shares of output and expanding intra-regional trade (ibid, 280). 
Integration in the region has been achieved through cooperation among governments to 
support efficient international trade and provide useful support to trade liberalisation. This is 
because economic cooperation among the ASEAN states was supported by many inter-
governmental contacts promoting information flows and confidence in the maintenance of 
open trade policies (ibid). The combination of reforms and dismantling of trade barriers 
among APEC members have triggered internationally oriented strategies, which promote 
strong expansion of intra-regional trade, without significant elements of trade discrimination. 
This has led to countries (the US and Canada) outside of Western Pacific securing 
participation in trade expansion (ibid, 285).   
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Kelegama (2000) sees open regionalism as a building block because it is flexible. It is also 
more member-friendly than other regional arrangements such as free trade areas. Moreover, 
open regionalism was devised to primarily focus on addressing obstacles to deep integration 
issues, which are caused by divergences in domestic policy and level of development. The 
first APEC forum extended the concept to cover shallow integration issues, which are 
comprised mainly of tariff and non-tariff barriers (Kelegama 2000, 4526). It should be noted 
that policy induced divergences by competition, industrial structure, poor infrastructure, and 
poor technical skills are not subjected to trade negotiations but are rather products of a low 
level of development. In the discussion about open regionalism, “shallow integration44” has 
gained wide prominence.   
Kelegama (2000) and Bergsten (1997) explain the APEC’s choice to opt for shallow 
integration. Kelegama asserts that: (a) while the current WTO structure allows non-
discriminatory multilateral trade rules, leaders in the region envisaged that there might be a 
long dragged out process like the Uruguay Round, and decided to address obstacles to trade 
liberalisation themselves; (b) the overall objective of the APEC members was to dominate 
future global negotiations, not to prevent any benefits of its actions to non-participants. The 
latter necessitates creating incentives for a positive response to trade liberalisation from the 
rest of the world. However, open regionalism best suits APEC because:  
(a) many of the countries in APEC within Asia achieved reduction in trade 
barriers unilaterally without reference to international negotiation because it 
was consistent with their development strategies; and (b) the patterns of 
trade and trade policy tend to favour a strong preference to avoid 
discrimination as well as discriminatory trading arrangement. This has 
several unique points for APEC: (1) it would remove the need to work out 
preferential rules of origin as well as elaborate plans to qualify as a free 
                                       
44 Non-discrimination rules for services are regarded as "shallow integration” conceptions of trade 
agreements.  Global rules for areas such as competition policy, intellectual property and expropriation 
of investments would constitute "deep integration.” 
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trade area under Article 24 of the WTO; (2) it would prevent labelling 
across the world that APEC is violating its own pledge to do away with 
new preferential and discriminatory practices; and (3) it would prevent the 
risk of creating new trade conflicts and violating the key interests of all the 
APEC members in maximising the strength of the global trading system 
and its institutions (Bergsten 1997, 553).  
Kelegama also asserts that open regionalism fosters multilateralism because:  
(a) there are no laws and binding contracts, and decisions are made through 
consensus; (b) compliance to any trade commitment is voluntary in the 
absence of rigid institutional structure and bureaucratic apparatus to specify 
obligations; and (c) the ROOs complicate global rules through the creation 
of overlapping rules of origin under preferential trade (2000, 4525). 
 It is believed that open regionalism will support the emergence of a new multilateralism 
because it embodies the characteristics to improve the likelihood of the emergence of a 
sensible multilateralism. Secondly, open regionalism lays institutional structures to make 
multilateralism friendlier, since they are driven by: (i) market forces rather than government 
control; (ii) inter-regional alliances rather than a universal presence of their own; (iii) 
technological innovation and information; and (iv) the convergent demands of global 
consumers of goods and services in an increasingly global market place (Mistry 1995, 20). 
Thirdly, it strengthens multilateral process in a framework that gives weaker states a voice in 
the decision-making process (ibid). Given the discussion above, open regionalism has the 
potential to be a building block for multilateralism. It is, therefore, important to look at FDI 
within the context of a FTA between two or more countries. 
3.10 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
A FTA is not about trade alone. Another key component of a FTA is FDI. FDI has become 
the key source of foreign financing for emerging markets. This makes the role of the FTA an 
important issue, as a determinant of the location of FDI (Yeyati et al. 2003). According to 
Athukorala and Menon (1997), FDI is categorised into two parts: market-seeking investment, 
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and efficiency-seeking investment. Market-seeking investment is undertaken in order to 
supply the host and other markets in the region. This can take two forms: tariff-jumping 
investment or investment triggered. This is necessitated by tariff preferences, as well as 
investment driven by the market enlargement effect of the FTA. Efficiency-seeking 
investment is driven by the desire to gain competitive advantages over those provided by the 
home economy. 
It should not be assumed a country’s FDI inflow would increase the moment that it signs an 
FTA. This is not usually the case. Worth (1998) argues that FDI migrates to countries with a 
large market size and that a FTA has the greatest influence on FDI through its effects on 
market size. This is because lowering intra-regional tariffs can lead to expanded markets, as 
well as an increase in FDI. The EU has attracted FDI because its trade liberalisation policies 
enhanced market size (ibid, 81).  However, the effect of a FTA on FDI will vary by country 
(ibid). Countries in a FTA with the strongest locational advantages will attract most of the 
FDI oriented toward serving the regional market. Countries with weak locational advantages 
will see little change in their level of incoming FDI because of a FTA (ibid, 79). Worth (ibid) 
further explains that when a FTA encourages either a national treatment standard for foreign 
investments or a guarantee against expropriation of those investments by the foreign firms or 
governments, such a provision will ultimately improve the investment climate. Even so, two 
factors determine whether a FTA will lead to an increase in FDI. Blomstrom and Kokko 
(1997) argue that the effects of an FTA on FDI depends on the attractiveness of a country as 
a destination for FDI, and the magnitude of that country’s liberalisation of trade and 
investment policies.  
The effect of a FTA on FDI, however, is not necessarily positive. According to Cuevas et al. 
(2005), a FTA can reduce the incentives for FDI if the original purpose of FDI is to bypass 
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trade barriers to supply a protected domestic market. On the other hand, when countries’ 
factor endowments are unequal, capital has incentives to relocate to the labour-intensive 
country; those incentives are strengthened when the flow of goods between countries 
becomes unhindered (ibid). In addition, the impact of FTAs on FDI will largely depend on 
whether the source country is a member of a FTA or an outsider.  Yeyati et al. (2003, 6) 
claim that if the FDI is horizontal in nature, as is the case with tariff jumping, then the 
formation of FTAs that reduce trade barriers in a preferential way should discourage FDI 
among members. With respect to the effects of a FTA by a source country, Yeyati et al (ibid) 
argue that this can be affected by FTA activity by a source country, whether or not the host is 
a partner of the source. Accordingly, if common membership in a regional integration 
agreement with the source country makes a host relatively more attractive as a location for 
FDI, Yeyati et al. (ibid) further argue that such a FTA will make non-members less attractive; 
this can result into FDI diversion.  In light of the above statements, it is pertinent to examine 
FDI and FTAs within the context of the NAFTA, focussing specifically on Mexico. Such an 
examination will not only establish the connection between a FTA and increased trade, but 
also between a FTA and FDI.   
3.11 NAFTA and FDI: Lessons of Experience in Mexico 
Mexico is a good example of a country where a FTA has increased the inflows of FDI. Since 
joining NAFTA in 1994, there has been a large increase of FDI into Mexico. According to 
Pacheco-Lopez (2005), Mexico’s main strategic advantage from NAFTA membership is the 
lowering of entry barriers to investment from foreign multinational corporations. Mexico 
expected that FDI would promote economic development through knowledge spill-overs and 
faster export growth. Mexico did not only join NAFTA as a matter of further liberalising 
trade, but also to create the legal and economic conditions conducive for FDI (Cuevas et al. 
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2005). Mexico embarked on reforming the Foreign Investment Law to make it compatible 
with NAFTA, because NAFTA’s investment provisions are meant to contribute to a less 
discriminatory investment environment among its members (Pacheco-Lopez 2005, 1161). 
Earlier, the law prohibited FDI in services by placing a limit on the repatriation of capital. 
This reform in Mexico, and its joining of NAFTA, enabled foreign investors to locate 
operations in Mexico while taking advantage of the North American market rather than 
serving the Mexican domestic market itself. With these, Mexico became one of the world’s 
largest recipients of FDI inflows, with 70 percent of it from the US (ibid). NAFTA makes 
Mexico a key destination for FDI because: stability in the region’s policy toward Mexican 
exports makes Mexico more attractive for investment in export-oriented activities, and policy 
stability is a key benefit of NAFTA; strengthening the legal status of the Mexican 
government’s commitment to open enables NAFTA to consolidate an investment-friendly 
policy environment, which ultimately boosts FDI; and NAFTA enables investors outside 
North America to see Mexico as an export platform to the US, and thus increases their 
willingness to locate production facilities in Mexico (Cuevas et al. 2005). With respect to the 
sectoral destination of FDI flows into Mexico, Pacheco-Lopez (2005) points out that the 
manufacturing sector has accounted for 67.3 percent of total FDI inflow.  
In conclusion, the last two decades have seen an increased use of FTAs as a framework for 
inter-country trading. Arguments remain as to the usefulness of these agreements, but their 
proliferation suggests it is beneficial. However, the extent to which FTA member-countries 
benefit is largely dependent on the FTA’s trade-creating or trade diversion effects. As already 
discussed, a FTA is not only about trade. It is usually accompanied by FDI, as illustrated by 
the experience in Mexico. China’s FTAs will be assessed to determine if they are just about 
trade, or if there is a FDI component to its FTAs. In the case that China’s FTAs include an 
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element of FDI, this FDI will be assessed to determine if it is market-seeking investment or 
efficiency seeking investment, as it relates to Africa. Mexico has also shown that FTAs can 
lead to reform in some sectors. While analysing multi-country data, Cuevas et al. (2005) 
argue that a FTA seems to have a strong positive influence on FDI. However, being a 
member-country of a FTA is not sufficient to attract FDI. As exemplified by Mexico’s 
membership of NAFTA, this is dependent on a set of variables, which include a set of 
domestic policies: having an open economy, having a stable macro-economic performance, 
and having an improvement in the legal environment. The next chapter will delve into the 
specific case of China’s FTAs to discuss how and with whom China signs FTAs, the reasons 
for signing, as well as how it selects its FTA partners.    
  
 56 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Understanding China’s FTAs 
4.1 China’s FTAs 
China has not publicly articulated its FTA strategy or how it selects its FTA partners. 
Because of China’s limited resources and the likelihood of China’s FTA partners increasing 
in the future, China will need to prioritise potential partners as well as partners’ significance. 
This is consistent with the position of Qingjiang (2012, 1206) who argues that China has a 
small, and currently over-stretched, trade negotiation team. This suggests that as the numbers 
and scope of China’s trade negotiations increase, it will be impossible for China to keep up 
with the demands of these relationships.  
However, Zhao and Webster (2011, 105) emphasise that China’s FTA strategy is modelled 
along the same lines as that used by the US, which has opened its domestic markets in the 
pursuit of economic interdependence with its FTA partners. According to Zhao and Webster 
(ibid), China’s FTAs are best understood as a series of agreements rather than the “big bang” 
type. The authors, however, draw a clear distinction between the Chinese FTAs and the 
American FTAs. The American position emphasises that its FTA partners must adhere to the 
rule of law and good governance. China does not interfere with the domestic political 
situation and internal conditions of partner countries (ibid).  
What stands out in China’s FTAs partner selection is the adoption of a pragmatic approach by 
setting up customised bilateral FTAs, which consider economic and strategic interests (Zhang 
et al, 2007, 6).  Goa (2009, 7) argues that there are two models of FTAs: the European Union 
model, which includes both economic and political integration; and the NAFTA model, 
which focuses on economic integration alone. Goa (ibid) further maintains that the NAFTA 
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model can be divided into two sub-categories: (i) the Economic Partnership Agreement 
approach, which is favoured by countries like Japan; and (ii) the narrower approach, which 
focuses on trade in goods only. China has opted for the narrower model, which comprises 
trade in goods. Gao (ibid) argues that China’s preference, therefore, is to start an agreement 
on trade in goods only, and to expand to trade in services and investment after commitments 
on goods have been substantially implemented. The choice of model does have an influence 
in the choice of its FTA partners.  This chapter will discuss reasons for China’s FTAs and 
partners’ characteristics.    
4. 2 Economic, Trade, Complementarities and ‘Hubbing” Effects 
Economic development is the bedrock of China’s trade policies. The main goal is that its 
FTAs rest on economic development as their primary purpose. This means that China is 
hoping to achieve the reduction, or phasing out, of tariffs and non-tariff barriers through 
FTAs by: improving market access conditions; creating more business opportunities; and 
enhancing trade and investment environments (Wang 2011, 505). Wang (ibid) argues that 
most of the FTAs have promoted bilateral trade between China and its partner countries. For 
instance, trade, investment and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan have 
developed after the implementation of their FTA. The China-New Zealand FTA has enabled 
China to replace the US as New Zealand’s second-largest trading partner. When the China-
ASEAN FTA45 came into effect, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN countries 
increased by 49.6 percent (ibid).  
China signs FTAs to gain economic advantages, as well as better treatment than it receives 
under the WTO (Ravenhill and Jiang, 2009, 32). At the same time, there are growing 
                                       
45 China-ASEAN FTA is regarded bilateral because it is signed between China and one economic 
bloc. 
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protectionist measures among China’s largest trading partners, notably the US and the EU. 
This has led China to seek alternative arrangements to further liberalise its trade and gain 
favourable access to other markets (ibid, 34). Moreover, China’s trading partners have 
pursued aggressive FTA strategies. China wants to be proactive to ensure that its exports and 
investments do not suffer through trade diversion and discrimination (Zhao and Webster 
2011).  Hoadley and Yang (2007, 332) maintain that FTAs will enhance the efficiency and 
productivity of China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
Moreover, China’s FTA participation can be viewed as a competitive plan to secure a more 
favourable position in future, larger FTA initiatives. Zeng (2010, 640) emphasises that FTAs 
serve to cushion the tension that may arise out of China’s trade relations with its regional 
trading partners. Zeng (ibid) further argues that China’s neighbours, Japan and South Korea, 
are concerned with China’s FTA activities. The author also asserts that China’s FTAs are 
driven by intra-regional competitive dynamics and an effort to catch up with the regional race 
toward FTAs. According to Jiang (2010, 251-252) there are four economic motivations for 
China’s FTAs.  First, FTAs help China increase its exports and diversify its markets. Since 
exports have been a major source of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, Chinese 
officials expect exports of manufactured goods to grow through FTAs.  Second, FTAs will 
help reduce costs for Chinese customers and producers. For example, an FTA with Australia 
will enable Chinese consumers to buy high quality but cheaper wine. Also, there has been an 
increase of ASEAN industrial parts to China, which are, in turn, exported to third-country 
markets. Most of these industrial parts are either processed or assembled in China (Ravenhill 
2006).  Third, Chinese officials hope that FTAs will help China attract foreign investment 
and participate in international industrial restructuring. China hoped that an FTA with 
ASEAN would create an enlarged domestic market, which would ultimately attract more 
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foreign investments to the region.  Fourth, competition that would be brought about by FTAs 
would enhance the productivity of domestic industries and prepare them for global 
competition. 
As already noted in Chapter Three, FTAs can lead to either trade creation or diversion. One 
of China’s goals in signing FTAs is to minimise trade diversion. Zeng (2010, 641) argues that 
the FTA between China and Chile is largely to prevent the potential loss of market access to 
third markets and discriminatory policies against Chinese products. Economic and trade 
complementarities and competition are important for China when choosing its FTA partners. 
China’s FTA partners either complement or compete with China, depending on their 
industrial base. According to Gao (2009) and Qingjiang (2012), a large portion of China’s 
FTA partners’ economic structures compete rather than complement. A few FTA partners do 
complement China economically. For example, Singapore and Hong Kong are highly 
competitive in services export. In addition, New Zealand, Chile, and Peru are very 
competitive in agricultural exports. China is relatively uncompetitive in both the services and 
agriculture sectors (ibid). The ASEAN countries, on the other hand, share an industrial 
structure with China that relies on export-oriented, labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. 
This means their exports are also mostly in electronics and textile products, which are similar 
to those from China (Gao). Qingjiang (2012) argues that only a small fraction of China’s 
FTA partners complement China economically. The China-Australia FTA will be 
complementary to the Chinese economy because China’s exports to Australia are clothing, 
computer equipment, toys, communication equipment, and furniture. China’s top imports 
from Australia are iron, ore, wool, crude oil, coal, and lead (Hoadley and Yang 2007, 339). 
Hoadley and Yang (2007, 342) further assert that China and Chile’s economies are also 
complementary. Chilean imports from China are textile, chemical material and hardware, 
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household appliances, and machinery. Chile’s exports to China are mostly timber, mining, 
nitrates, fish powder, copper, and fruit. China is competing with manufacturing industries in 
Africa, although there are also trade complementarities between China and Africa. Domestic 
producers in Africa, their workers, and Trade Unions are more likely to be hesitant about a 
FTA with China (Inquirer 2015). This may be a source of friction between China and African 
countries in any proposed FTA initiative.    
The hub effects play important roles in China’s FTA choice of partners. According to Zhao 
and Webster (ibid), many of China’s FTA partners are important trade hubs. The authors note 
that China signs FTAs with partners that are FTA hubs. This is because China can potentially 
tap into the broader markets created by FTAs or other trade arrangements already in place. 
Given the hub effects, Qingjiang (ibid) argues that a large number of China’s FTA partners 
are members of other FTAs, which China values more than the market size of the hub 
country. Gao (2009) argues that measured by most standards, the domestic markets of many 
of China’s FTA partners are small but nearly all of them are important FTA hubs. For 
example, Singapore, which signed a FTA with China, has FTAs with several countries, 
including the US, Japan, Korea, and Australia (ibid). Chile is one of China’s FTAs partners 
that has already negotiated full or partial FTAs with partners in four continents (Hoadley and 
Yang 2007). Moreover, Chile is an associate member of both MERCOSUR46 and the Andean 
Community47 (Qingjiang 2012). China also views Chile as a bridge between South America 
and Asia, as well as a platform for China to reach the vast market of Latin America (Zhang et 
al. 2007).  
                                       
46 MERCOSUR is an economic and political agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. 
47 The Andean Community is a community of four countries namely Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador and 
Peru. 
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In addition, Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which has 
free trade relationships with the European Union through the European Economic Area (Gao 
2009). India and Pakistan are both members of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (ibid). New Zealand is also interconnected with Australia, politically and 
economically. This makes it an attractive option for the Chinese who wish to gain closer 
economic cooperation with the much larger Australian economy (Sigurdsson 2014, 61). 
China also considers Thailand as a gateway to the rest of Southeast Asia (Zhang et al. 2007). 
By entering into FTAs with these partners, China has strategically positioned itself to tap into 
the bigger markets created by FTAs’ economic community arrangements that are already in 
place. Goa (ibid) concludes that this is the most cost-effective way for China to explore new 
markets. What can be inferred from this discussion is that China places great importance on 
the ability of its partners to act as FTA hubs in their respective regions. It should be noted, 
however, that the “hub effect” is more pronounced in countries where the rules of origin are 
poorly enforced.   
4.3 Geo-Political, Security and Diplomatic Reasons 
China signs FTAs not only for economic reasons, but also for geo-political, security, and 
diplomatic reasons. According to Zhao and Webster (2011), China wants to engage with its 
neighbours through FTAs. China sees this as a strategy that can bring about closer political, 
diplomatic, and security relations. This is largely because China’s neighbours have perceived 
its economic growth as a potential threat. Wang (2011, 508) argues that China uses FTAs as 
one of the ways to allay such fears, because countries participating in FTAs with China will 
become more open and friendly. They will also share common interests and responsibilities. 
Specifically, Chin and Stubbs (2011, 279) expose one key issue, highlighting the importance 
of the China-ASEAN FTA; China wanted to respond to the evolving China-threat perception 
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which has shifted from traditional security to economic security concerns. The signing of a 
FTA with ASEAN was seen as a natural choice for China. Hoadley and Yang predicated this 
on three main considerations:  
(a) FTAs with Southeast Asia would offer another opportunity for China to 
discredit the idea that it poses a threat; (b) Southeast Asia could be China’s 
main ally in resisting the West’s pressure on issues like political 
liberalisation and human rights; and (c) closer relations with Southeast 
Asian countries will make it difficult for Taiwan to build up its political ties 
with countries in the region (2007, 335).  
The FTA between China and ASEAN is an indication that China has a better relation than 
any of its rivals with ASEAN countries. Thus, China’s FTA interests are parallel to its desires 
to be a major but responsible power, given its “peaceful rise and peaceful development.” This 
will potentially demonstrate that China’s economic growth is an opportunity and not a threat 
(Hoadley and Yang 2007, 346).  
China has used its FTAs to normalise relations with its trading partners. According to Wang 
(2011), Peru had frequently used trade remedy measures against Chinese products. Peru is the 
first country to apply textile safeguards. The relationship between China and Peru was tense 
until they both signed the FTA agreement. The FTA largely phased out trade barriers and 
enabled most of their trade disputes to be settled through bilateral mechanisms (ibid, 506).  
China is also using FTAs to achieve its “One China Policy" and diminish Taiwan’s influence 
in the region and in other parts of the world. China used FTAs to entice some countries to 
cease diplomatic ties to Taiwan (Gao 2009, 14). Goa (ibid) asserts that Costa Rica ended its 
ties of over six-decades with Taiwan shortly after Costa Rica signed a FTA with China. 
China is also using the Closer Economic Partnership Agreements48 (CEPA), which it signed 
                                       
48 The CEPA is a FTA concluded by the Mainland with Hong Kong and Macau which covers three 
areas: trade in goods, trade in services, trade and investment facilitation. 
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with Hong Kong and Macau, as a model to bring Taiwan back into the economy of the 
Mainland. Thus, with the conclusion of on an Economic Cooperation Framework 
Arrangement49  (CEFA) with Taiwan in 2010, China used a FTA as a political achievement 
to establish relations with Taiwan (Wang 2011, 511). While CEFA was negotiated and 
concluded within the WTO framework, Gao (ibid) argues that the CEFA will boost 
Taiwanese investment in the Mainland. This will ultimately “legalise cross-strait, direct trade, 
which has been prohibited by Taiwan’s age old Act that governs the relations between 
Peoples of Taiwan and Mainland China” (ibid, 16). The deeper economic integration between 
China and Taiwan will make it difficult for Taiwan to be politically separated from China; 
thus Taiwan will be more dependent on China than on Hong Kong and Macau (ibid). Deeper 
economic integration between China and Taiwan can come from preferential access to the 
largest market in Asia, which will favour Taiwan through Chinese concessions (Sigurdsson 
2014, 47).  
Political and diplomatic relations with China carry much weight in terms of the choice of 
FTA partners. There must be a cordial relationship between China and its intending FTA 
partners. In this regard, Chinese FTA partners must have maintained a good relationship with 
China, as well as good diplomatic ties. According to Gao (2009), Chile was the first country 
in South America to establish a diplomatic relationship with China. In the same vein, 
Pakistan has been an ally of China for a long time. While it took Singapore a long time to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with China, it did so when China was faced with 
sanctions and political isolation in the late 1980s (Qingjiang 2012, 1202-03). China and New 
Zealand had a good political and diplomatic relationship before the signing of their FTA 
agreement. The political and diplomatic relations helped in signing the FTA; these predated 
                                       
49 China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan in 2010 to 
enhance Taiwan's economic prosperity and prevent Taiwan from being marginalized in East Asia. 
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the commencement of the negotiation because New Zealand first recognised China as the 
Mainland’s legitimate government as early as 1972 (Sigurdsson 2014). The good diplomatic 
and political relationship that existed between China and New Zealand enabled the latter to 
be the first Western country to put China on the list of approved destination status50 (ibid). 
This means Chinese citizens can travel unhindered to New Zealand for leisure (ibid). It is 
also suggests that the prospects for China signing FTAs in Africa will be closely influenced 
by the depth of political, diplomatic, and economic relations that China has with each 
potential country. This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
4.4  Recognition as a Market Economy 
China has made it clear that the first step toward FTA negotiations with any partner is the 
recognition of China as a market economy. Any country that recognises China as a market 
economy has a weaker case to prosecute China in anti-dumping51 cases under the WTO 
(Wang 2011). The anti-dumping agreement allows member nations to treat non-market 
economies differently from the countries that enjoy market-economy status concerning 
disputes over anti-dumping and safeguard duties (Jiang 2008; Zeng 2010; and Wang 2011). 
The economic rationale behind being recognised as a market economy country is that it 
would render Chinese exports less vulnerable to arbitrary anti-dumping actions (Ravenhill 
and Jiang 2009, 32). Ravenhill and Jiang (2009, 32) further argue that a partner’s recognition 
of China as a market economy has been a non-negotiable precondition for the 
commencement of FTA negotiations. This ultimately influenced the FTA invitations that 
                                       
50 Approved destination status is granted to overseas destinations through a bilateral agreement. The 
policy concerns tourism and it was created to account for the growing interest of Chinese citizens in 
foreign travel. 
51 Anti-dumping cases are established when a foreign government provides assistance and subsidies, 
such as tax breaks to manufacturers that export goods, enabling the manufacturers to sale the goods 
cheaper than domestic manufacturers. 
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China had accepted. China obtained acknowledgment of its market economy status from 
ASEAN in 2004, before the agreement on goods was signed (Ravenhill and Jiang 2009, 39). 
New Zealand was the first developed country to grant China market economy status (Zeng 
2010). New Zealand consequently waived its rights to press anti-dumping measures against 
China in accordance with its WTO accession protocol (Zeng 2010, 644). Since New Zealand 
recognised China as a market economy, many other countries have done so. With more 
countries recognising China’s market economy status, there are mounting pressures on other 
countries to follow New Zealand’s example and accept China’s market economy status as an 
established precedent (Gao 2009, 12). Australia is the second industrial country to treat China 
as a market economy in anti-dumping and safeguard investigations, following the 
commencement of the China-Australia FTA (ibid). Chinese officials hope that their 
recognition as a market economy by some industrialised FTA partners will encourage other 
major economies, like the US and EU, to follow (Jiang 2010, 255). With the signing of the 
China-Iceland FTA, Iceland has played a key role, becoming the first developed European 
country to accept China’s full market economy status (Lanteigne 2010). Iceland’s recognition 
paved the way for other European countries to follow soon after. This sets a precedent on the 
European continent regarding access to preferential trade with the Chinese mainland (ibid). 
Overall, 79 economies have recognised the market economy status of China, including all its 
FTA partners (Gao 2009; and Jiang 2010).  
4.5 Raw Materials 
The need for a steady supply of raw materials motivates China to sign FTAs. This has 
become a key consideration while selecting FTA partners. China is still a country dominated 
by an export oriented growth strategy. China’s desire for FTAs is to enhance its access to raw 
materials. Ravenhill and Jiang (2009, 33) assert that China’s FTAs aim to enhance resource 
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security because China’s growth has rested on enormous increases in imports of raw 
materials, particularly imports of energy. According to Qingjiang (2012, 1200), most of the 
agricultural sector in China is not very competitive not only because of its low per capita land 
ratio, but also its need to ensure a steady supply of agricultural products in order to free up its 
labour from agriculture for manufacturing. At the same time, Wang (2011, 507) opines that 
China is not energy-efficient; it consumes vast amounts of energy, and there seems to be no 
way of limiting its energy demand in the foreseeable future.  
Given this consideration, China’s choice of FTA partners reflects its demand for raw 
materials. As a result, Zhang et al. (2007, 8) argue that raw material imports dominate 
Chinese imports from FTA partners. Similarly, Zhao and Webster (2011) argue that China’s 
pressing need for raw materials permeates several of its choices for FTA partners. Vast 
copper reserves made Chile an ideal FTA partner with China. Likewise, Peru’s silver, iron 
ore, and copper are also attractive to China (ibid). New Zealand, with its healthy mineral 
resources as well as increasing oil exports and exploration, made it a prime candidate for a 
FTA partner. Given its strategic location, Pakistan is an important part of China’s access to 
the Central Asia and Middle East oil routes (Sigurdsson 2014, 53). As a FTA partner, Iceland 
is also a good choice to support China’s energy needs (ibid). Iceland’s largest exports are in 
aluminium; moreover, its world-class geothermal technological and technical knowledge and 
expertise mean that China can use this knowledge to improve its own geothermal capabilities 
(Lanteigne 2010, 372-73).  
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Table 4.1 Reasons for China’s FTAs 
Country        Reasons for FTAs 
ASEAN-China FTA  Economic 
 Security 
 Political 
 Diplomatic 
Hong Kong-China, 
Closer Economic 
Partnership 
 Economic 
 Geo-Political 
Macao-China Closer 
Economic Partnership 
Arrangement 
 Economic 
 Geo-Political 
Thailand-China FTA  Economic 
 Diplomatic 
 Political 
 Trade Hub 
 Market Economy status 
Chile China FTA   Economic 
  Political 
  Trade hub 
 Raw materials 
Pakistan-China FTA  Economic 
 Political 
 Trade hub 
 Raw materials 
New Zealand-China 
FTA 
 Economic 
 Political 
 Diplomatic 
 Market Economy status 
 Raw materials 
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Singapore-China FTA  Economic 
 Diplomatic 
 Political 
Peru-China FTA  Economic 
 Political 
 Diplomatic 
 Raw materials  
 Trade hub 
Taiwan China 
Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement 
 Diplomatic 
 Economic  
 Political 
Costa Rica-China FTA  Economic 
 Diplomatic 
 Political 
 Raw materials 
 Trade hub 
Iceland-China FTA  Economic 
 Political 
 Diplomatic 
 Raw materials 
 Market Economy status 
Switzerland-China 
FTA 
 Economic 
 Political 
 Trade hub 
 Market Economy status 
Australia-China FTA  Economic 
 Political 
 Diplomatic 
 Raw materials 
 Market Economy status 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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What is noticeable in Table 4.1 is that China signs FTAs mainly based on economic, 
political, and diplomatic reasons. Other reasons include providing trade in raw materials, as 
well as recognising China as a market economy, and serving as trade hub. China expects that 
its FTA partners must also have these characteristics to align with China’s own potential 
economic interests.   
4.6 Partners’ Importance to China 
China’s FTA partner selection also includes the importance a potential FTA partner. China 
accords varying importance to FTA partners or potential partners. A partner’s importance to 
China can be measured through the number of presidential visits, China’s internal decision-
making processes, and its relative economic size. China’s political and diplomatic agenda 
plays a key role in its FTAs. A good measurement of China’s recognition will probably be 
the number of visits by the Chinese president. Since becoming president in 2013, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has visited Latin America three times in four years (2013, 2014, and 
2016). The goal of each visit was to enhance cooperation in trade, investment, finance and 
nuclear power, as well as to seek the expansion of a FTA with Chile (Baijie 2016). On the 
other hand, President Xi Jinping has only visited a few African countries twice (2013 and 
2015). The last visit in 2015 was mainly to attend the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), hosted by South Africa (Gaffey 2015). The disparity between the number of visits 
by the Chinese leader to Latin America and to Africa suggests the level of importance that 
China places on both continents. Already, there are FTA partners in Latin America for China. 
With respect to China’s internal decision-making processes, the supreme decision making 
authority on foreign policy solely rests within the collective leadership of the Politburo 
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Standing Committee52 (PSC). The PSC is the top decision-maker. It decides on the general 
guidelines such as the “Going Out” strategy. The PSC also allows Chinese agencies to draft 
specific policies for implementation (Sun 2014).  Two of these agencies are the Ministry of 
Commence (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These agencies are 
involved in the designing and implementing China’s African policy. Issues, such as FTAs 
with Africa, must be discussed at the highest level of decision-making, the PSC. A country or 
economic bloc that wants to sign a FTA with China will need to be approved by China’s top 
decision-making body (Sun 2014).  
China has placed much importance on its partners having well-functioning economies and 
high credit ratings (Zhao and Webster 2011). For example, Chile and Peru are considered the 
top two credit-worthy countries in South America. New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Australia have healthy and sophisticated economic structures. This is because 
China wants to establish FTAs built on solid economic foundations to avoid potential 
economic problems that may arise (Zhao and Webster 2011).   
In addition, China’s total global trade and investment has been increasing since the reform 
and opening up. China’s FTA partners are reflected in the volume of trade and FDI. Sun 
(2014) argues that although there has been growth in China’s FDI to Africa, the growth is a 
small fraction of China’s total global FDI. For example, in 2011, China’s total global 
investment in Africa was 4.3 per cent, which is far less than the percentage in Asia (60.9 per 
cent), Latin America (16 per cent) and Europe (11.1 percent) (ibid). 
                                       
52 The Politburo Standing Committee acts as the most powerful decision-making body in China, and 
its decisions de facto have the force of law. 
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Fig 4.1 China's FDI Flows Abroad (US$ Millions) 2003-2012
 
Source: UNCTAD database, based on data from the Ministry of Commerce 
 
It is evident from Figure 4.1 that the bulk of China’s FDI is destined for countries in Asia; in 
particular, this FDI targets East Asia and South East Asia. Countries in this part of Asia are 
China’s FTA partners, through agreements such as the China-ASEAN FTA. While proximity 
of the ASEAN countries may explain this high FDI, it is likely that trade agreements such as 
FTAs also play a role. Both Latin America and Europe also do better with respect to China’s 
FDI. Although China’s investment in Africa is rising, Chinese FDI in Africa is still low 
compared with China’s FDI in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Just as in Asia, the 
proximity of Africa to China might have played a role in deciding whether China should 
invest in Africa. On the other hand, China’s lack of FTAs, either bilateral or multilateral 
among African countries, may be largely responsible for the relatively low volume of 
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Chinese FDI in Africa compared to the ASEAN countries. It is possible that signing a FTA 
with Africa might be a game changer.  
 Finally, what is apparent from the earlier discussion is that China does not have a FTA 
partner in Africa. The question then is: what are the prospects of China signing FTAs with 
countries in Africa? Three countries in Africa (Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan) will be 
examined in the next chapter, given their trade relationships and volumes of trade with China 
in recent years.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Case Studies: Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan 
5.1 China-Africa FTAs?  
Chapters One and Two have outlined the growth in China-Africa trade. The phases of 
China’s engagement with Africa were analysed in Chapter Two. The current phase includes 
the “Going Out” strategy, which China embarked upon to reposition its economy and 
enhance its global participation, both in trade and economic spheres.   
China has signed several Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) and Memorandum of 
Agreements (MOAs) with African countries. Both MOUs and MOAs cover a number of 
areas, such as: Free Trade Zones, economic and technical cooperation, energy and financing 
of power plants, defence cooperation, and many others. These MOUs and MOAs have led 
China to establish Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in countries such as Nigeria and Kenya. An 
MOU is a formal agreement between two or more parties. MOUs are not legally binding, but 
they have an element of seriousness and mutual respect. A memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) describes a cooperative relationship between two parties wishing to work together on 
a project or to meet a certain agreed objective.  
This chapter will discuss whether China might choose to go beyond MOUs and MOAs to 
sign FTAs with Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. In this regard, relevant economic data, as 
well as political and social indicators will be examined. The selected three countries are 
discussed in the next section.  
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5.2 Discussion of Investment and Trade between China and Nigeria, Sudan and South 
Africa 
In Chapter Two, Chinese trade and investment in Africa was discussed generally, without a 
specific focus on any country. This chapter will focus specifically on trade and investment in 
the selected three African countries. Inconsistencies in data provided by China and African 
countries create a major limitation to the analysis of trends. Burke et al. (2008, 14-15) find a 
substantial difference between the trade figures declared by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the trade departments for each country that trades with China. 
The authors further argue that discrepancies in the data may be attributed to a broad range of 
factors, including corruption and technical issues. For this reason, trade data from the United 
Nations (UN) Comtrade will be used, because it is a repository of official trade statistics. 
Therefore, trade between China and the selected three African countries will be examined 
from 1999 to 2014, as there is adequate data available for the selected three countries in the 
UN Comtrade.  
According to the UN Comtrade (2016), the value of trade between China and the former 
Sudan53 increased from US$70.2 million in 1999 to US$8.4 billion in 2011 (by this time the 
country split and South Sudan was created). This value peaked in 2010 at US$10.4 billion 
and dropped to US$8.39 billion in 2011 (ibid). The uncertainty surrounding the partitioning 
of Sudan may have explained the drop between 2010 and 2011. The value of trade between 
China and Nigeria increased from US$363.3 million in 1999 to US$11.87 billion in 2014, 
and the value peaked in 2012 at US$15.75 billion. It decreased to US$10.79 billion the 
following year (ibid).  For South Africa, the value of trade increased from US$1.33 million in 
1999 to US$20.4 billion in 2014. Just like Nigeria, the value of trade between South Africa 
                                       
53 Sudan was a single country until a referendum was conducted in 2011 in which 99 per cent of 
voters in the South opted to secede from the country's North.  
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and China also peaked in 2012 at US$28.05 billion and dropped to US$24.13 billion the 
following year (ibid). Comparing the value of trade in products between China and its three 
major trade partners in Africa, namely Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan, the value of trade 
between China and South Africa has been the highest during the period under consideration, 
followed by the value of trade between China and Nigeria.  
Table 5.1 presents the growth rates (percent) in the value of trade between China and the 
three major trading partners in Africa during 1999-2014. In the former Sudan, the value of 
trade increased by almost 11 times between 1999 and 2000. It declined, by about 5 percent, 
during 2001/2002, and increased at the range 29 percent to 61.2 percent during 2003-2006.   
However, the highest decline was recorded during 2006/2007 when the trade value declined 
by 73 percent. This period corresponds to a time of conflict in Sudan, in which the rebel 
leader Bahar Indrisu Gardar was accused of planning to kill 12 African Union Peacekeepers. 
But as the United Nation’s International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague dropped the 
case for lack of evidence (BBC 2010), the value of trade between China and Sudan increased 
substantially by 448 percent. The value of trade between China and Sudan also declined 
during 2008/2009. This period was marred by the Darfur conflict, during which the ICC 
issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in Darfur. The Sudanese government expelled 13 international 
agencies and three local agencies from Sudan (Thomson Reuters Foundation 2014).  The 
value of trade further declined by 19.2 percent during 2010/2011, as the country was about to 
split. 
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Table 5.1: Growth Rates (percent) in the Value of Trade Between China and Three Trade 
Partners in Africa  (1999-2014) 
Year Former Sudan  Nigeria South Africa 
1999/2000 1087.65  8.19 14.62 
2000/2001 50.65  66.35 18.61 
2001/2002 -4.90  24.47 71.28 
2002/2003 61.22  46.41 49.39 
2003/2004 49.43  56.16 36.36 
2004/2005 61.21  64.04 42.35 
2005/2006 29.02  3.70 41.66 
2006/2007 -73.04  82.74 11.68 
2007/2008 448.26  -21.16 -1.57 
2008/2009 -16.84  47.28 39.87 
2009/2010 41.16  30.50 36.34 
2010/2011 -19.23  36.60 -6.52 
2011/2012 -  31.57 12.44 
2012/2013 -  -31.51 -13.98 
2013/2014 -  10.03 -15.43 
Average 
per year  142.88 
 
30.36 22.47 
Source: Author calculation from the data from UN Comtrade (products) 
For Nigeria, the value of trade increased by a little over 8 percent during 1999/2000. During 
the politically stable period of 2000-2005, the value of trade between Nigeria increased in the 
range of 24.5 percent to 66.4 percent.  The increase in the value of trade could be attributed to 
a surge in oil prices. According to the US Energy Information Administration (2013), average 
 77 
 
crude oil prices were at historically high levels for the second year in a row. The value 
declined by 21.2 percent in 2007/2008, but continued to increase thereafter (ibid). Notably, 
the modest increase of 3.7 percent in 2005/2006 occurred during a period of political 
uncertainty in Nigeria, due to the sudden death of the former President Yar Adu’a, which 
paved the way for then acting President Goodluck Jonathan. Furthermore, the decline of 31.5 
percent during 2012/2013 corresponds almost exactly to the increase witnessed a year earlier, 
following the split of the former Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan. 
For South Africa, the value of trade increased steadily over time, with a modest decline of 
1.57 percent and 6.52 percent in 2008 and 2011, respectively. However, the value of trade 
between China and South Africa had been on the decline during 2012 to 2014. Further, as in 
the case of Nigeria, the decline of 12.44 percent during 2012/2013 was similar to the increase 
witnessed a year earlier, following the split in the former Sudan. The possible explanation for 
this decline could be the increased political violence in South Africa, characterised by a wave 
of violent strikes in the mining, agricultural, and transport sectors. These strikes resulted in 
over 50 deaths, including the killing of 34 mineworkers by the police (Freedom House 2013). 
It is also important to examine the weighted values of total African trade with China in order 
to assess the strength of the trade relationship between China and the selected three countries. 
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Table 5.2 China’s Trade Values in Selected African Countries (USD $ billion) 
Year 
China’s 
Total Trade 
(SSA) 
Former 
Sudan Nigeria 
South 
Africa 
Weighted 
Value  
1999 2.9 0.7 0.363 1.3 0.814 
2000 5.1 0.83 0.393 1.5 0.533 
2001 5.3 1.3 0.65 1.8 0.707 
2002 10.31 1.3 0.813 3.1 0.505 
2003 15.3 2 1.2 4.63 0.512 
2004 22.1 2.9 1.9 6.3 0.502 
2005 30 4.6 3.1 9 0.556 
2006 42 6 3.2 13 0.528 
2007 58.7 1.6 5.8 14.2 0.36 
2008 84.8 8.9 4.6 14 0.324 
2009 70.6 7.4 6.71 19.6 0.477 
2010 102.3 1.03 8.76 26.7 0.356 
2011 140 8.4 12.07 24 0.317 
2012 160 - 15.75 28.05 0.273 
2013 170 - 10.7 24.1 0.204 
2014   - 11.8 20.4 - 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution database; World Bank; and Pigato and Tang 2015 
As shown in the Table 5.2, until very recently, the selected three countries have had a 
dominant share of the African continent’s volume of trade with China. In 1999, more than 80 
percent of Chinese trade in Africa was with these three countries. It is observed from Table 
5.2 that the weight of overall trade, as the share of these three countries, declines to 32 
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percent in 2011; this is the last year for which the data for Sudan was available. This may 
suggest that China is spreading its trade to other countries in Africa, rather than concentrating 
on these three countries. This shift might be a result of political instability in Nigeria, Sudan, 
and to some extent in South Africa. Another reason for this could be that China does not want 
to concentrate its trade (and perhaps investment) in the three countries, but instead spread-out 
across various markets. This decision might also have to do with avoiding future (potential) 
failures in Africa. For example, in 2006 the China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation (CCECC) had an investment portfolio of $8 billion, which was designated for 
the upgrade of the Nigerian railway; this shrank to $850 million at the end of 2007 (Konings 
2007), and the CCECC was unable to complete the lines.  
In summary, this section has examined the value of trade and total trade between China and 
its three major African trade partners, namely, Nigeria, South Africa and the former Sudan. 
Not only do the three countries have significant trade with China, but additional important 
points can be deduced from an analysis of growth rates in trade values between China and the 
three major trade partners. From the above analysis, it can be deduced that China’s trade is 
sensitive to the political developments in partner countries, especially Sudan and Nigeria. In 
particular, the value of trade has always declined during periods of political conflicts or 
uncertainties. South Africa, which has been relatively stable politically, compared to Nigeria 
and Sudan, has received steady increases in the value of trade with China over time.  
At this point, it is appropriate to proceed by examining China’s trade, investment, and other 
economic-related relationships with each of the three African countries. Such an examination 
will further clarify the extent of the relationships between China and the selected three 
countries.  
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5.2 Republic of Sudan 
Sudan is one of the largest and most diverse countries in Africa. It has a history of conflict. 
At the core of the civil wars was the question, “who controlled the oil rich region of South 
Sudan,” especially with the Southern separatists seeking the control of resources (BBC 
2016). The first civil war, from 1955 to 1972, was fought between the Sudanese government 
and Southern rebels. The rebels demanded greater autonomy for Southern Sudan. The war 
ended in 1972 through the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement (ibid). The agreement 
granted significant regional autonomy to Southern Sudan on internal issues. The second civil 
war began in 1983, as longstanding issues were triggered by then President Jaafar Nimeiri’s 
decision to introduce Sharia law. In 1988 and 1989, talks occurred between the government 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army54, or SPLM/A, of Southern Sudan 
(Enough Project 2016). The talks were abandoned when General Omar al-Bashir took over 
power in 1989, through a military coup. However, in 2002, the SPLA and the Sudanese 
government signed an agreement for a six-month, renewable cease-fire.  Further talks in 
Kenya led to a breakthrough agreement between Southern rebels and the Sudanese 
government to end the civil war (BBC 2016). The civil wars between the North and Southern 
separatists led to the deaths of 1.5 million people.  
While the civil wars between the government of Sudan and the SPLA were about control of 
the oil rich Southern region, the conflict in Darfur was purely about the economic and 
political marginalisation of non-Arabs. The conflict in Darfur, which began in 2003, 
displaced over two million people, and more than 200,000 people died (BBC 2015). The 
original Sudan was divided into two countries in 2011, after the people of the South Sudan 
                                       
54 The Sudan People's Liberation Army is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. The SPLA was 
founded as a guerrilla movement in 1983 and was a key participant of the Second Sudanese Civil 
War. 
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voted for independence; the capital of the new country was set in Juba, and Sudan’s capital 
was set in Khartoum. The population of Sudan is 36 million (Central Intelligence Agency 
2016), while South Sudan is 12 million (ibid).  
Sudan was an early target of China’s “Going-Out” strategy in Africa (Large 2009). Large 
(2009, 615) argues that Sudan was identified as a long-term overseas oil supply base and a 
country to support the global development of Chinese corporations. Moro (2012) classifies 
China-Sudan relations into three phases. The first phase was a period of low-key ties that 
followed the official recognition accorded to China. The period was characterised by 
reciprocal presidential visits and trade assistance. The dominant goods traded were Gum 
Arabic, oil seeds, and cotton; 26 percent of Sudan’s cotton export went to China (ibid, 24). 
During the same period, Sudan imported textiles and building materials from China (Moro 
2012). 
The second era was characterised by substantial ties with an increase in trade. The items of 
trade remained largely the same as in the first phase. The only difference was the intensity of 
trade between the two countries. The third phase was marked by the continued expansion and 
cultivation of relations with the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM, 
(ibid). A new phase in the relationship emerged in 2011 with the creation of South Sudan, 
thus, creating two centres of power: Khartoum and Juba. 
Prior to 1989, China’s economic and aid relations with Sudan were characterised by barter 
trade, concessionary loans, and medical assistance (Large 2008a, 95). According to Large 
(2008b), China maintained good relations with Sudan during the parliamentary and military 
governments. China-Sudan relations took a new dimension after Sudan’s National Islamic 
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Front55 (NIF) deposed the elected government and seized power in 1989 (Ojha 2009, 77; and 
Large 2009, 611). According to Hui (2015, 373), the NIF ideological agenda and ties with 
terrorism led to international isolation and economic sanctions against Sudan. One of the 
outcomes was the suspension of Sudan by several international agencies. Sudan was also 
slammed with economic sanctions by governments around the world. The IMF suspended 
Sudan for failure to pay its arrears (Large 2008b, 278). With pressure from around the world 
and economic isolation, Sudan found a willing partner in China as its key international 
sponsor and partner (Hui 2015, 374; and Large 2009, 611). Large (2008b, 280) argues that 
Sudan’s political isolation and vast natural resources created a tremendous opportunity. 
According to Large (ibid), the international isolation and economic sanctions created a 
financial constraint for the new government, which necessitated the NIF to adopt a policy of 
economic self-sufficiency. Sudan subsequently turned to China to invest in its oil sector.  
Large (2008a, 98) argues that the thrust of Chinese engagement in Sudan aims to pursue 
business as a form of applied politics. Chinese officials realised that nothing could be 
achieved without the ability to navigate through the political waters in Africa. A genuine case 
of mutual government-to-government benefit, without any political complications, later 
developed into a more embedded, strategic and multi-stranded engagement (Large 2009, 
611). Large (ibid, 612) identifies three main narratives, which explain China’s Sudan policy 
after 1989:  
(i) China’s strategic diplomacy was motivated by economic interests, which 
was largely a function of its energy security imperativeness; (ii) A shift from 
passive engagement to a more constructive engagement, which altered the 
blind support for Sudan to a more active involvement in pressure aimed at 
                                       
55 National Islamic Front was an Islamist political organization founded in 1976 and led by Dr. 
Hassan al-Turabi that influenced the Sudanese government starting in 1979, and dominated it from 
1989 to the late 1990s. It was later reconstituted as National Congress Party. 
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ending the civil war in Sudan; and (iii) The need for a more classical liberal 
case, which emphasised the benefits of increasing trade and economic 
growth for peace in Sudan.   
It is noteworthy that oil has been at the center of the Sudan-China relationship. Large and 
Patey (2011) described Sudan-China relations primarily as a petro-partnership. In 1992, the 
US banned American companies from participating in oil exploration in Sudan in the 
aftermath of the NIF regime’s seizure of power. Subsequently, all Western-based oil 
exploration companies ceased operations, following pressure from the US (Moro 2012). In 
the midst of the civil war and international sanctions against Sudan, China emerged as 
Sudan’s single most important economic partner and external friend (Large 2009, 614).   
The importance of Sudan to China also needs to be contextualised. Large (2008a) argues that 
Sudan is important to China’s economic engagement with Africa because:  
(a) it was China’s third largest trade partner after South Africa and Angola in 
2004 and 2005; (b) it was the highest recipient of Chinese net non-financial 
overseas direct investment in Africa until the end of 2005; (c) Northern 
Sudan is a growing market for Chinese exports; and (d) Sudan has a 
comparatively established market for Chinese companies. 
Sudan is also a gateway to regional markets, including the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA). The key characteristic of the China-Sudan relationship is that 
both countries’ economic relations are directed by political and corporate elites. The Chinese 
government tends to have close relations with Sudan’s ruling leadership. Furthermore, 
China’s importance to Sudan is more significant than Sudan’s importance to China (Large 
2009, 616). According to Large (ibid), Sudan has become a key country for established 
Chinese economic interests. However, Large (ibid) asserts that oil dominates Sudan’s trade 
with China, and oil investment is at the heart of the subsequent expansion of various Chinese 
businesses. 
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5.2.1 Trade and Investment 
The economic sanctions imposed against Sudan by the UN, and its designation by the US as a 
sponsor of international terrorism, led to Sudan’s economic isolation. Investors were 
unwilling to invest in Sudan. Many investors, who had invested in Sudan, abandoned their 
interests and relocated elsewhere (Pannell 2008, 720; and Parello-Plesner et al. 2014, 125-
126).  According to Pannell (ibid), the withdrawal of other, mainly Western based, investors 
in Sudan emboldened China to partner with Sudan.   
Sudan contributed 9.26 percent of China’s total oil imports, or 40.68 percent of China’s oil 
imports from Africa in 2002 alone (Large 2008a, 97).  According to Ojha (2009, 76), China 
was Sudan’s largest consumer of oil. China was also Sudan’s biggest foreign investor and 
third largest trade partner between 2004 and 2005. The total bilateral trade was $2.52 billion 
and $3.91 billion respectively (Large 2008b, 286). In 2005 and 2006, China imported 47 
percent of Sudan’s oil production. In addition, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) invested more than $4 billion into the Sudanese market (Holslag 2008, 71). 
However, Sudan’s share in China’s total foreign trade was between 0.2 percent and 0.3 
percent (Ojha 2009, 78). Relying on data from the Bank of Sudan, Large and Patey (2011) 
assert that China accounted for 76 percent of Sudanese exports and 22 percent of imports 
from 2005 to 2009. In the past two decades, China has invested more than $10 billion in 
Sudan, providing low-interest loans and weapons transfers in return for oil (Winsor, Morgan 
2015) The oil boom has been favourable to the market expansion of Chinese manufactured 
products in Sudan (Large 2008a, 99). Large (ibid) further argues that the expanded Chinese 
business activities in Sudan involved a number of different companies beyond state-owned 
firms, specifically, ventures started by Chinese entrepreneurs in Sudan. Apart from oil, China 
is also diversifying its business interests into mining, construction, and transport 
 85 
 
infrastructure. According to Ojha (2009, 82), two Chinese firms have built a $1.5 billion 
railway linking Port Sudan and Khartoum. There is also an increase in the level of activities 
for the Chinese in agricultural development projects.  
The diversification of Chinese business interests in Sudan is reflected in the number of small 
businesses across Sudan, including: shops, restaurants, and service sector businesses (Large 
2008b, 287). Furthermore, the penetration of Chinese products in Sudan results from the fact 
that Chinese products are generally inexpensive.  
5.2.2 Discussion and Analysis 
The above discussion illustrates the extent of the relationships between China and Sudan. It is 
important to examine whether or not Sudan meets China’s criteria for signing FTAs and 
selecting FTA partners. It will be helpful to determine if Sudan is a good “candidate” for a 
Chinese FTA. One of the key reasons that China signs FTA is purely economic. As already 
indicated, Sudan was an early target of China’s “Going-Out” strategy to reposition Chinese 
firms that were privatised. China also hopes to achieve increased trade with its FTA partners; 
this includes reducing trade barriers, improving market access, and creating conditions for 
increased business opportunities (Wang 2011).  
When choosing its FTA partners, China also considers the economic and trade 
complementarities of its partners. China and Sudan have developed economic relations that 
have resulted in increased in trade and investment. At the same time, there are trade 
complementarities between the two countries. Sudan imports machinery, equipment, 
manufactured goods, transport equipment, textiles, and chemicals from China. There has also 
been an increase in the export of mechanical and electronic goods from China to Sudan (Ojha 
2009). Sudan’s imports from China are consistent with the Chinese motive for its FTAs. The 
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exports and imports also demonstrate that the comparative advantage holds for both 
countries. Sudan is one of the countries where China can get natural resources in adequate 
volumes. Furthermore, Sudan also needs Chinese inputs to build technology and develop its 
infrastructure.  The two countries do not compete, but rather complement each other. Both 
the economic and trade complementarities criteria, which China requires to sign FTAs, are 
applicable to Sudan. Given this consideration, the trade complementarities between China 
and Sudan make the latter a good candidate for a FTA partner which China.  
Sudan represents a hub for other markets in the Eastern region. The goal of China is to enter 
into FTAs with countries that can help it tap into other broader markets. Rather than simply 
targeting a country-specific FTA, China strategically targets other markets that trade through 
the country in question, in order to indirectly gain closer access to other markets.  It does not 
matter to China if its FTA partner has a small domestic market, but China values a partner 
that serves as an important hub. Sudan is a hub because of the regional trade group to which 
it belongs. Sudan is a member of COMESA, which is a regional trade group. This criterion 
enables Sudan to fit into China’s FTA partner selection criterion. Sudan also meets one of the 
China’s FTA selection criteria: availability of raw materials. Raw materials needed by the 
Chinese are available in Sudan. China-Sudan trade is dominated by oil and gas. In 2002, 
Sudan contributed 40.68 percent of China’s African oil imports (Large 2008a).  It is not just a 
mere coincidence that China considers the availability of raw materials in its trade partners 
when signing FTAs. It is to ensure that China’s industrial base has access to raw materials. 
Obviously, Sudan passes this selection criterion test.  
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All countries that have entered, or are about to enter, into FTAs with China must recognise 
China’s market economy status.56 Sudan is one country, among the WTO-members, that has 
recognised China as a market economy (Xinhua News Agency 2006). In view of this, Sudan 
meets Chinese criteria for selecting its FTA partners.  
Political, security, and diplomatic ties are key reasons for China’s FTAs. Unlike the countries 
in ASEAN, Sudan does not pose any security risks or concerns to China. This is because both 
countries are not neigbours. However, there is China’s military cooperation and arms transfer 
to Sudan. The arms trade has occurred within the context of the close military relations 
(Large 2008a, 98). China has also acted as Sudan’s key international patron because of its 
policy of non-interference in the political affairs of Sudan. The non-interference policy 
resulted in delaying international intervention over the conflict in Darfur (ibid). While this 
can be seen as security cooperation, it merely amounts to the preservation of Chinese self-
interest in Sudan. If one considers the proximity of China and its ASEAN partners, such 
proximity does not apply to Sudan. Sudan does not pose any security threat to China, and 
Sudan does not see China as a threat, unlike its ASEAN neigbours (Chin and Stubbs 2011, 
281). Based on these considerations, Sudan does not meet the security criterion for China’s 
FTAs. With respect to political and diplomatic considerations, political relations between 
Sudan and China have been characterised by high-level government and corporate ties (ibid). 
According to Large (2008a), there is a symbolic cooperation agreement between the Sudan 
National Congress Party and the Communist Party of China. China and Sudan established 
diplomatic relations in 1959. This diplomatic relationship continues to this day. The key 
inference from this assessment is that Sudan does not recognise Taiwan and subscribes to the 
                                       
56 A market economy is an economic system in which economic decisions and the pricing of goods 
and services are guided solely by the aggregate interactions of a country's individual citizens and 
businesses. 
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“One-China Policy” (FOCAC 2017). The diplomatic and political relationship between China 
and Sudan make the latter a good candidate to be a FTA partner with China. With the 
exception of security, the foregoing indicates that Sudan’s characteristics meet the conditions 
to sign a FTA with China.  
5.3 South Africa 
South Africa is one the most advanced economies on the African continent. South Africa is 
an ethnically diverse and multi-racial country (CIA 2016) and home to 55.6 million people 
(Statistics South Africa 2016). According to Pannell (2008, 714), due to labour shortages in 
the early 20th Century, more than 60,000 Chinese labourers were brought to work in South 
Africa’s mines and on agriculture projects. The increase in the number of Chinese labourers 
required the South African government to set up of a formal consular arrangement, including 
the repatriation of some labourers (Alden and Wu 2014).  The increased number of Chinese 
workers depressed local jobs. That depression consequently led to the passage of the Cape 
Chinese Exclusion Law,57 which prohibited the immigration of Chinese people. In 1910, 
nearly all Chinese labourers returned to China (ibid). However, in the contemporary period, 
Pannell (2008) argues that the phasing out of apartheid laws in South Africa has led to the 
steady increase in the Chinese population.   
South Africa and China established formal diplomatic relations in 1998. The two countries, 
nevertheless, have had a chequered relationship. The evolution of this relationship went 
through many stages, which were heavily influenced by the political instability in both South 
Africa and China. Alden and Wu (2014) argue that the apartheid policy58 was an important 
factor, which defined South Africa’s relations with the rest of the world. Before the “One 
                                       
57 The Cape Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904 was enacted to prohibit large scale immigration from 
China. 
58 Apartheid regime is a former policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination 
against non-European groups in the Republic of South Africa. 
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China Policy,” the political situation in South Africa created a “dual recognition diplomacy.” 
To elaborate, the South African government established diplomatic links with Taiwan. At the 
same time, the African National Congress (ANC) was getting financial support from 
Taiwan’s government during the apartheid regime (ibid).  
During the apartheid regime, there were fears that China’s support for Non-Aligned Nations59  
(NAN) could undermine South Africa’s economic and security interests, because of its stance 
on anti-colonialism and racial equality (Naidu 2006, 460). Those fears were reinforced within 
the apartheid government, culminating in the cutting of ties between the two governments. 
Consequently, South Africa’s government established diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
(ibid).  Naidu (2006) argues that the relationship was symbolic because both Taiwan’s and 
South Africa’s governments were isolated within the international community. They both 
saw themselves at risk from aggression. The two sides deepened their political, economic and 
bilateral trade (ibid).  
As China’s Communist Party changed its outlook on foreign policy towards liberation 
organisations, China committed itself to support national liberation organisations in South 
Africa (Taylor 2000, 100). China also encouraged a negotiated settlement as a political 
solution to apartheid rule in South Africa (Taylor 2000, 102). Despite its support for the 
ANC, China maintained surreptitious relations with the apartheid regime. Naidu (2006; 462) 
contends that China courted both the ANC and the apartheid government because it wanted 
to forge a robust relationship with both sides in the post-apartheid regime, particularly within 
the context of the Taiwan issue and the Chinese Communist Party’s outward global policy.  
                                       
59 Nations of the Third World that as a group rejected alliance with either the United States or the 
former Soviet Union. 
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With the first multi-racial democratic election held in 1994, which was won by Nelson 
Mandela, the new government was faced with two dilemmas over its relationship with China. 
There were trade and investment linkages with Taiwan. At the same time, China’s increasing 
political and economic dominance in the global setting could not be ignored (Naidu 2006, 
463). The latter was considered critical because China’s growing economic rise in the global 
system could only be ignored at South Africa’s peril. The relationship between China and the 
new democratically elected government was strengthened in anticipation that this would have 
spill-over effects, including: allowing access to a large consumer market; establishing a 
strategic partnership for promoting the interests of the emerging markets of the developing 
world; facilitating the sharing of the common tasks of development and advocacy for a multi-
polar, rather than a unipolar, world system; and promoting a common agenda for the reform 
of the global political and economic system (ibid, 465).   
South Africa’s relationship with China in the post-apartheid period was, thus, regarded as a 
part of larger geo-political shifts and a changing world order (Wasserman 2012, 338). The 
improved relationship led to diplomatic visits by both governments’ leaders. The visit by 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to South Africa led to the signing of the “Pretoria 
Declaration” (Shelton 2004, 59). The key component of the declaration was the establishment 
of a Binational Commission. The Commission would guide and coordinate all government-
to-government relations. It was also designated as a forum for consultation on matters of 
mutual interest in bilateral and multilateral affairs (ibid).  
5.3.1 China-South Africa Trade 
In the early 1990s, China and South Africa started commercial exchanges. The 
complementarity between the two countries was seen as an excellent foundation for 
mutually-beneficial commercial interactions. To facilitate trade, South Africa granted China 
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market economy status, one of the China’s key prerequisites for signing a free trade 
agreement (Naidu 2006, 468). According to Shelton (2004, 60), direct trade relations 
commenced, and the two-way trade began to increase. Shelton (ibid) further asserts that the 
volume of bilateral trade in 1991 was just $14 million, but reached $1.5 billion within six 
years, with the two-way trade valued at $2 billion in 2002. China-South Africa trade had 
grown to $2.75 billion in 2004 (Naidu 2006). By 2008, China emerged as South Africa’s 
primary import and export trade partner. Grimm et al. (2014, 18) argue that “South Africa’s 
natural resources, market size and political stability are the major attractions for Chinese 
businesses.” South Africa is the first country in Africa to grant approved destination status to 
China, ostensibly to boost its tourism and service industry (Naidu 2006, 472).  
Many aspects of the relations between the two countries contributed significantly to this rise 
in trade. South Africa is seen as a hub through which China can expand its influence to other 
countries in the region. Grimm et al. (2014) argue that, aside from state-to-state relations, 
there are other key levels of relations, like party-to-party and city-to-city relations. South 
Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and the Communist Party of 
China (CCP) have been involved in various discussions. There were also province-to-
province and city-to-city relations. According to Grimm et al. (2014), since 1998 Durban and 
Guangzhou have established city-to-city relations while Gauteng and Shandong have 
established province-to-province relations. Despite the increase in trade between the two 
countries, Pannell (2008, 715) asserts that the terms of trade were absolutely in China’s 
favour. Figure 5.1 shows the trade balance between China and South Africa from 2008 to 
2012.  
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5.3.3 Discussion and Analysis 
It is evident from the above discussion that South Africa and China have strengthened their 
relationship. What also stands out in this relationship is that it has not been smooth sailing. 
The reason, of course, is because of political situations in South Africa and China, which 
played an active role during both apartheid and post-apartheid periods. It is therefore 
necessary to discuss China’s motivations for signing FTAs and its criteria for choosing its 
FTA partners. This discussion will offer insights into whether South Africa meets the criteria 
for becoming one of China’s FTA partners. In terms of economic factors, the South African 
government assigned MFN status to China (Herman 2011, 116). Assigning the MFN status to 
China has demonstrated that economic issues have a priority. South Africa represents China’s 
biggest trading partner in Africa, and accounts for 20 percent of China’s total trade with the 
entire continent (Naidu 2006, 468). South Africa meets China’s economic considerations 
with which China considers before signing FTAs. Based on this, South Africa is also a good 
candidate to become a FTA partner with China.  
China considers the trade complementarity of its FTAs partners. This is to avoid a situation 
whereby its FTA partners compete with each other. As it will be discussed later in this 
chapter, to a certain degree China and South African manufacturing sectors do compete. 
China prefers countries in which the principles of comparative advantage are considered 
strong. With respect to South Africa and China, the complementarity of the two economies 
has provided a good foundation for mutually beneficial commercial and economic 
interactions. Trade complementarity has enabled South Africa to import high technology 
goods, capital equipment, and electronic goods from China (Naidu 2006, 468). South Africa 
has also exported iron ore, manganese, chrome, tobacco, granite, gold, copper, aluminium, 
and auto components to China (ibid, 470). China has reduced tariffs for some products, such 
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as beef, fruit juices, and wine (ibid, 473). South Africa is expected to take advantage of tariff 
reductions to accelerate the exports of these products. The imports and exports of both 
countries demonstrate their complementarities. Trade complementarities between China and 
South Africa make the countries potential FTA partners.  
China signs FTAs with countries that can serve as a trade hub to tap into other larger markets.  
South Africa, apart from being a key market in the Southern African region, is a hub to many 
countries in that part of Africa. One may take it for granted that China may target South 
Africa’s market because of its size; however, the location of South Africa also makes it an 
excellent hub, from which China may tap into other markets within the region. For example, 
South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
consisting of 15 member states. China can tap into these countries’ markets through its 
connection to South Africa. With respect to South Africa, its attraction as a potential FTA 
partner is largely based on its market size. With the passing of the ‘hub’ test, South Africa is 
a perfect candidate to become China’s FTA partner in Africa. Importantly, China also signs 
FTAs to seek raw materials to supply its growing industrial base. This reason guides China 
when selecting its FTA partners. China seeks FTA partners that are rich in natural resources. 
South Africa is very rich in natural resources. Wasserman (2012, 338) asserts that China 
regards South Africa as Africa’s “mineralogical treasure house.” This is because South Africa 
is the largest producer of gold and has reserves of other important metals. These natural 
resources are the main South African exports to China. South Africa’s abundant natural 
resources will endear it to China, who will be anxious to commence and complete FTA 
negotiations. All countries that enter into FTAs with China must recognise it as a market 
economy. This is a prerequisite that China cannot waive. Accordingly, South Africa has 
granted China market economy status (Herman 2011).   
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Political, security, and diplomatic ties are key considerations for China in selecting its FTA 
partners. Political and diplomatic reasons rank high in the requirements for FTA selection. 
With respect to security, South Africa does not pose a security threat to China. Due to the 
distance between the two countries, neither country is perceived as a potential aggressor in 
the way China may be perceived among its neigbours. However, political and diplomatic ties 
between China and South Africa are more pronounced. The dismantling of the apartheid 
regime in South Africa opened up the possibility of establishing official relations between 
China and South Africa. Both China and South Africa have signed the Pretoria Declaration 
on Partnership, which led to the setting up of the Bi-National Commission.60 In addition, 
there has been a high-level visit between the two countries, and bilateral cooperation has 
continued to deepen in many areas. Wasserman (2012, 338) argues that South Africa’s 
current relationship with China, in the post-apartheid period, should be seen as a part of 
larger geo-political shift and a changing world order. According to Wasserman (ibid), the 
dynamic and evolving nature of the relationship between China and South Africa as emerging 
geo-political powers is best understood within the geo-economic order. This was reflected in 
2010 when South Africa was invited to become part of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China), which later became BRICS with the addition of South Africa (ibid). In addition, 
South Africa subscribes to “One-China Policy” (Phagane and Tsotetsi 2016). The extent of 
the diplomatic and political relationship between China and South Africa makes South Africa 
a potential FTA partner for China.  
 
                                       
60 Bi-National Commission will guide and coordinate all government-to-government relations 
between China and South Africa, and to consult on matters of mutual interest in the bilateral and 
multilateral spheres. 
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5.4  Nigeria 
Nigeria is the most populous and diverse country in Africa, with 182 million people (CIA 
2016), and more than 250 ethnic groups (ibid). China-Nigeria relations began in 1971, when a 
Nigerian delegation visited China (Gbadamosi et al. 2009). The visit resulted in the signing 
of a joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations (Abu-Akoh 
2014, 65). The relationship has remained strong over the years, which led to the 
establishment of the China-Nigeria Friendship Association61 in 1994 (Ekedegwa 2010, 108). 
The association commenced various bilateral and economic relations between the two 
countries (ibid).  
The robustness of the relationship has been demonstrated through visits at the highest level, 
including regular visits by the leaders of both countries, as well as various visits at other 
levels (Ogunkola et al. 2008, 2). Last year, Mohammed Buhari, the current president of 
Nigeria, visited China to strengthen the existing relations (Nigerian Television Authority 
2016). Agubamah (2014, 63) argues that the hallmark of China-Nigeria relations is not just to 
strengthen diplomatic ties, but also to expand and deepen economic and other cooperation. In 
view of Nigeria’s market size and its geographical position as a hub to other West African 
countries, China and Nigeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment 
of a Strategic Partnership in 2006. This makes Nigeria the first country in Africa with which 
China agreed to sign such an MOU (Taylor 2007, 631).  
                                       
61 The Nigeria-China Friendship Association was established to promote Friendship, Political, 
Socioeconomic, Cultural, Educational, Trade, Industrial, Technological, Scientific and Sporting 
collaboration between the government, corporate bodies and citizens of both Nigeria and China on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefits after the approval of appropriate arms of both governments. 
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Taylor (ibid) notes that, given the importance of China-Nigeria relations, Nigeria is the first 
country with which China scheduled a direct flight. According to Egbula and Zheng (2011, 
8), the China Ocean Shipping Group (the largest shipping company in China) has established 
its West Africa hub in Nigeria. In 2000, both China and Nigeria showed support for this 
engagement by signing agreements to establish a Nigerian Trade Office in China and a 
Chinese Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centre in Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng 
2011, 4).  
However, Taylor (2007, 632) opines that African policymakers have no coherent strategy 
regarding how best to deal with China, compared with China’s coherent strategy. Taylor 
(ibid) further indicates that Nigeria best exemplifies this lack of a coherent strategy. 
According to Taylor (ibid), Nigeria’s China policy hinges upon the Nigerian government’s 
commitment to developing a solid relationship with China on a range of economic and 
political matters, without asking questions about the likely negative implications of such ties. 
The only measurement that indicates that China-Nigeria relations are working is if the elites 
and well-connected prosper through the relationships. As argued by Egbula and Zheng 
(2011), Nigeria’s China policy involves the awarding of oil contracts in exchange for China’s 
commitment to deliver key infrastructure. On the other hand, China has a clear strategy in 
Nigeria; evidence of this fact is based on its economic interests and policy towards Nigeria, 
which include:  increasing Chinese multinational companies’ market share in Nigeria; 
expanding the Nigerian market for Chinese manufactured goods; increasing China’s presence 
in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector; and leveraging its investment in Nigeria as a gateway for 
further inroad into other countries’ markets in West Africa (ibid, 4-5). Taylor (2007) further 
argues that the lack of a coherent strategy to deal with Chinese engagement and elite driven 
policies is responsible for the gap between Chinese promises in Nigeria and the reality of 
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what China actually provides. This discrepancy between the promises and the reality suggests 
that China’s ambition in Nigeria is large-scale but with few results. The reason for this, as 
reported by 2010 Oyeranti et al. (2011, 187), is that Chinese promises and declarations 
captured by the media do not actually materialise. China and Nigeria have signed MOUs and 
MOAs to deepen their relationship and boost economic and political ties. The Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Council (NIPC) data shows that a total of 208 registered Chinese 
companies are doing business in Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng 2011). 
As Table 5.3 shows, the agreements between China and Nigeria cover a range of issues and 
sectors. Those agreements are not only meant to boost trade, but they are also meant to 
deepen diplomatic and political relations between the two countries. The latter is important 
because in the absence of strong diplomatic and political ties, economic relations would be a 
mirage.  
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Table 5.3: China-Nigeria Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) and Memorandum of 
Understandings (MOUs) 
S/N Type of Agreement Year 
1 Agreement on Trade, Investment Promotion and Protection 2001 
2 
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Tax on Income  2002 
3 Agreement on Consular Affairs 2002 
4 
Agreement on Co-operation on Strengthening Management of Narcotic 
Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Diversion of Precursor Chemical 2002 
5 
Agreement on Tourism Co-operation 2002 Agreement of South-South 
Co-operation among China, Nigeria and FAO 2003 
6 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership 2006 
7 Agreement against fake products exported to Nigeria from China 2009 
8 
Memorandum of Understanding on promotion bicameral economic co-
operation and partnership between Ogun State of Nigeria and Zhejiang 
Province of China 2009 
9 Memorandum of Understanding on peace co-operation 2010 
10 A pact on defence cooperation 2013 
11 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation 2013 
12 Agreement on Finance for Power Plant 2013 
13 
Agreement on Mutual Visa Exemption for Holders of Diplomatic and 
Official Passports 2013 
Source: Author’s compilation from: Egbula and Zheng (2011) and Ogunkola et al. (2008) 
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5.4.1 China-Nigeria Trade 
Trade has been an important aspect of Nigeria-China bilateral relations. The Nigeria-China 
trade relationship has increased since it started four decades ago. The trade between both 
countries was $384 million in 1998. However, by 2002, it had climbed to $2 billion (Taylor 
2007, 631). According to Egbula and Zheng (2011, 6), the increase in the volume of trade is 
the result of the China-Nigeria Agreement on Trade and Investment Promotion and 
Protection. Egbula and Zheng (2011, 6) argue that in 2010 trade between China and Nigeria 
accounted for nearly one third of the trade between China and West African countries, which 
also indicated the importance of Nigeria to China’s entry into the regional market. The 
volume of the trade reached $15 billion in 2015 (Ikuomola 2016). Although Nigerian exports 
to China have increased, they have not risen at the same pace as Chinese exports to Nigeria. 
According to Egbula and Zheng (ibid, 6), Chinese exports represented 67 percent of the 
bilateral trade total in 2000 and 87 percent of the total in 2010.  
The composition of the items in this trade is also important. According to Ogunkola et al. 
(2008, 7), exports to China are comprised of mineral fuel and lubricants, crude materials 
(excluding food and fuel), beverages, live animals, and manufactured goods. The authors 
argue that this constituted 61 percent of the total exports. This aligns with Egbula and Zheng 
(2011, 6), who assert that Nigeria’s exports to China are mainly oil and gas, and Chinese 
exports to Nigeria cover a range of goods, notably machinery, manufactured commodities, 
and equipment. Considering the huge Chinese oil imports from Nigeria, China-Nigeria trade 
grew from $384 million in 1998 to about $18.1 billion in 2014 (Oguh 2016). It reduced to 
$15 billion in 2015 because of the slump in oil prices (ibid).  
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5.4.2 Investment 
Investment is another means through which China and Nigeria have strengthened their 
relationships.  Since China’s main interest is its search for natural resources, Nigeria’s 
massive oil and gas reserves have attracted the attention of Chinese investors. Oyeranti et al. 
(2011, 189-190) list key characteristics of Chinese investment in Nigeria; these include: 
(a) the largest share of China’s investment is in the oil sector, followed by 
other solid minerals; (b) Chinese investments are carried out mainly by state-
owned enterprises, or enterprises with significant government equity; (c) 
Chinese investment is accompanied by Chinese workers, and most of the 
supplies are sourced from China; and (d) Chinese investment is offered with 
a large aid component, in the form of concessionary interest rates and grant 
elements.  
Investment in Nigeria can be categorised into two sectors: private and public. China’s private 
investment is largely concentrated in agriculture related industry, as well as the 
manufacturing and communications sectors (Oyeranti et al. 2010, 51). Some of these 
investments are joint ventures between Chinese and Nigerian investors. Others are wholly 
foreign, owned either by the Chinese or in partnership with other foreign investors (ibid).  
It is worth noting that some of the Chinese investments have also benefited from investment 
incentives in Nigeria; some of these benefits, such as pioneer status62 and expatriate quotas,63 
have been granted to some of these companies (ibid). With respect to Chinese public 
investment, Egbula and Zheng (2011, 9) argue that it targets natural resources and 
infrastructure, particularly power and transport, which are both badly needed in Nigeria. Thus 
‘oil for infrastructure’ became the hallmark of the Nigerian government during the Obasanjo 
                                       
62 Pioneer status is a tax holiday granted to qualified or (eligible) industries anywhere in the Nigeria 
and five-year tax holiday in respect of industries located in economically disadvantaged local 
government area of the Federation. 
63 The expatriate quota is the official permit given to business organizations operating in Nigeria to 
employ non-Nigerians into specifically approved job designations. It also specifies the duration of 
such employment as permitted. 
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regime as well as subsequent governments (Egbula and Zheng 2011,14).  Due to the oil for 
infrastructure linkage, Nigeria awarded the Chinese with a railway development plan to 
redesign the Nigerian railway system; the entire project was valued at $30 billion (Taylor 
2007:640). Chinese companies have also invested in the Nigerian telecoms market; active 
players include Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE), Huawei Technology 
Company Limited, Alcatel, and Shanghai Bell (Taylor 2007, 639; and Egbula and Zheng 
2011, 12).   
5.4.3 Discussion and Analysis 
Nigeria exemplifies a country that has a strong relationship with China. With its huge 
population and market size, Nigeria is a top country with which China will wish to maintain 
an increasingly strong relationship. China’s “Going-Out” strategy aligns with Nigeria’s 
market size and population. The above discussion indicates that China’s footprint in Nigeria is 
significant, considering its investment and trade. It is necessary to take a look at China’s 
reasons for signing FTAs and its FTA partners’ selection criteria to examine if Nigeria’s 
characteristics meet either the reasons for China’s FTAs or partners selection criteria. 
Economically, the goal of China’s FTAs is to increase access to markets and increase its 
exports. The former is consistent with Oyeranti et al.’s (2011, 190) argument that China is 
driven by its desire to seek access to more markets. Although Chinese economic activities in 
Nigeria are concentrated in strategic sectors, such as oil and gas as well as infrastructure 
development, the two countries have signed a number of MOAs and MOUs covering trade, 
technical cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, and investment protection. 
The two countries have set up a joint economic and trade commission (Chinese Foreign 
Ministry 2006). China's main exports to Nigeria are light industrial, mechanical, and electrical 
products. In turn, Chinese imports from Nigeria include petroleum, timber, and cotton (ibid).  
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Based on the economic reasons why China signs FTAs and it selection criteria, Nigeria is a 
good candidate for FTA partner.  
China also considers trade complementarities with its potential FTA partners. According to 
Oyeranti et al. (2010), there is a strong economic complementarity between China and 
Nigeria, because Nigeria is infrastructure deficient, while China has developed one of the 
world’s most competitive construction industries.  Nigeria has, in turn, been a supplier of raw 
materials needed by the growing Chinese manufacturing sector. Since China and Nigeria 
complement each other, this further makes Nigeria a potential FTA partner for China.  
In West Africa, Nigeria is a hub to other markets within the region. If China signs a FTA 
with Nigeria, it will be doing so with the aim of tapping into other neighbouring countries 
within the region. This will increase additional potential markets for China beyond Nigeria. 
In addition, Nigeria is also a gateway to many countries in West Africa. Nigeria is a member 
of the West African regional trading bloc, called the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), which comprises 15 member states. The fact that Nigeria is a hub 
perfectly meets one of the Chinese FTA partners’ selection criteria. This means that Nigeria 
will be a good candidate for a FTA with China. Another of China’s FTA selection criterion is 
the availability of raw materials. For example, China requires more oil and mineral inputs 
than its domestic resources can supply. Nigeria is a country that has many of these resources. 
The availability of raw materials in Nigeria makes it a good FTA partner for China.    
As already discussed, all countries that have signed FTAs with China recognise it as a market 
economy. Nigeria recognises China as a market economy (Xinhua News Agency 2004). 
Nigeria meets this FTA partner selection criterion. Political, security and diplomatic ties are 
key reasons for China’s FTAs. Political and diplomatic reasons are important criteria for 
selecting FTA partners. With respect to security, Nigeria does not pose any security threat to 
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China, just like the other two countries considered in this case. However, China’s 
investments in Nigeria need to be protected, considering the instances of insurgency in the 
northern64 part of Nigeria and the militant activities in the Niger Delta,65 which is an oil 
producing area in Nigeria. The activities of these groups pose a significant threat to Chinese 
investment in Nigeria (Channels Television 2013). For this reason, Nigeria and China have 
pledged military cooperation, especially in the training and retraining of security personnel 
for tackling terrorism and disaster response capabilities. Both China and Nigeria have 
embassies in their capitals. In addition, Nigeria recognises the “One China Policy” (Vanguard 
2017). This means Nigeria does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The diplomatic 
and political relationship between China and Nigeria make the latter a potential FTA partner 
for China. 
The three selected African countries (Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan) have been examined 
to assess if they are China’s potential FTA partners, given the reasons for China’s FTAs and 
its partner selection criteria.  
5.5 Potential Benefits and Costs of a FTA with China to Nigeria, South Africa and 
Sudan 
It is important to highlight the benefits of Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan signing a FTA 
with China. A FTA with China by the three counties can be a way of obtaining more access 
to larger markets and reducing tariffs. FTA negotiations involve reciprocal exchanges of 
concessions on trade barriers. The increase in trade through the reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers is manifested in China’s FTAs with both Peru and Chile. At the beginning of its 
FTA with China, Peru’s trade with China represented 12 percent of its total trade, up from 8 
                                       
64
 Boko Haram which has waged a deadly campaign against the federal government of Nigeria is 
rampant in the Northern part of Nigeria. 
65 The oil producing areas in Nigeria are prone to oil companies’ workers kidnapping and 
vandalisation of oil installations.  
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percent in 2003, while Chile’s trade with China increased from 9 percent of its total trade in 
2003, to 14 percent in 2008 (Wise 2012, 151-156). Similarly, the three African countries can 
also witness an increase in their trade with China when a FTA is signed. Whalley (1998, 71) 
argues that a FTA can underpin domestic policy reform and make it more secure. Chile and 
Peru accumulated large foreign exchange reserves after the commencement of their FTAs 
with China (Wise 2012, 3). The large foreign exchange reserves provided a financial cushion 
for deeper reform around a new trade agenda.66 A FTA between China and Nigeria, South 
Africa, or Sudan can also kick-start additional reforms in the industrial and financial sectors.  
The types of goods that the three countries import from China are higher in knowledge 
content, value-added, and technological inputs. With the signing of a FTA with China, there 
will be increased capacity building and transferring of knowledge from China to the three 
countries. This will contribute significantly to the human capital development that is needed 
by the three countries. One of the key components of a FTA is FDI. China’s FDI flowed into 
Chile and Peru after the signing of their FTAs (Wise 2016). If China signs a FTA with the 
three countries, it may change the dynamics of China’s investment, as it did in Latin 
America. This will be good news for these countries because a continued rise in China’s 
outward investment into the three countries means new opportunities, jobs, and economic 
growth.  
There are also potential costs to a FTA between China and the three countries. To some 
extent, Nigerian and South African manufacturing sectors compete with China’s. This may 
not be an issue with Sudan because its manufacturing sector, as a percentage of its GDP, was 
6 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2017). The manufacturing sector in China’s FTA partner 
                                       
66 New Trade Agenda addresses the de-regulation and libralisation of services and investment 
including a stronger protection of intellectual property rights. 
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country tends to decline after a FTA has been signed. According to the World Bank (2017), 
Costa Rica’s manufacturing sector, as a percentage of the GDP, was 16 percent in 2010; this 
was the same year that it signed a FTA with China. In 2015, the manufacturing sector, as 
percentage of GDP, declined to 13 percent. Peru signed a FTA with China in 2009. At the 
time, its manufacturing sector was 17 percent, as percentage of the GDP. The manufacturing 
sector fell to 15 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2017). Since both Costa Rica and Peru import 
finished goods from China, this must have had an impact on the local manufacturing sectors 
in both countries. The bulk of goods that Nigeria and South Africa import from China are 
finished products. Most of these products, such as footwear, bags, and textiles, are also 
manufactured in Nigeria and South Africa. China’s FTA with Nigeria and South Africa may 
also have an impact on the manufacturing sectors in the two countries. The manufacturing 
sector in Nigeria, as percentage of the GDP, increased from 2 percent in 2010 to 10 percent in 
2015 (ibid). A FTA with China may have an impact on the manufacturing sector and reverse 
the modest improvement in the sector. The South African manufacturing sector, as a 
percentage of the GDP, was 14 percent in 2010, but declined to 13 percent in 2015 (ibid). 
Just like the case in Costa Rica and Peru, a FTA with China may lead to a further decline in 
the manufacturing sector. Already, manufactured goods from China have affected local 
manufacturers in South Africa, reducing employment in the sector from 320,000 in 1994 to 
less than 120,000 in 2002 (Shelton 2004, 65). In Nigeria, textile imports from China have 
also depressed local textile factories in Nigeria, leading to a decrease in the trade of home-
spun fabrics ( Alaje 2017). There were 175 fully functional mills in Nigeria in the 1980s, 
which employed 800,000. The mills have since been reduced to 25, which could only employ 
24,000 people as of 2013 (Onuba 2013). Signing a FTA with China will create potential costs 
to Nigeria and South Africa. 
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The next chapter will discuss the possibility of China signing FTAs with Nigeria, South 
Africa and Sudan. The chapter will also discuss possible impediment(s) that can discourage 
signing a FTA with one or all of the three countries considered. This chapter will also discuss 
which country/countries has/have the highest prospects of signing a FTA with China.  
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Chapter Six 
 
6.1 Possibilities of China signing FTAs with Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan  
Chapter Four has laid out the reasons why China signs FTAs and the criteria with which it 
selects its FTA partners. Chapter Five has discussed that Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan 
meet the criteria with which China selects its FTAs partners and China’s reasons for signing 
FTAs. This chapter is aimed at discussing the prospects that China will sign FTAs with 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan in the near future. The chapter will then be concluded. 
Despite the fact that each country meets some of the main criteria to be selected as a partner 
for a FTA with China, there is, in fact, only a slim chance that China will sign FTAs with the 
selected three countries in the near future as there remain significant political and economic 
obstacles to be overcome. First, one of the ways to measure the political importance of Africa 
is through the visits made by the Chinese leader to Africa. China’s political and diplomatic 
agenda plays a key role in its FTAs. The current Chinese President, Xi Jinping, visited Africa 
twice, while he visited Latin America three times within his four years in office. The number 
of visits suggests how these countries are important to China. Already, there are Chinese 
FTA partners in Latin America.   
Second, Africa is at the fringe of China’s foreign policy. The US, the EU, and ASEAN 
member states are very important to China. These countries have the most impact over 
China’s economic and national interests (Sun 2014, 13). For example, a significant portion of 
China’s FDI goes to its Asia neighbours. This suggests that China’s neighbours in Asia 
impact China’s strategic interests. China will, therefore, be more inclined to devote its scarce 
resources to countries that have the most impacts on its national interests. Signing a FTA 
requires a great deal of effort and resources. At present, China devotes less attention and 
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resources to Africa (Sun 2014, 14).  It is less likely that China will commit its resources into 
the three African countries by negotiating a FTA.   
Third, the political decision-making process in China is another impediment. The supreme 
decision making authority on foreign policy rests with the PSC.  The PSC makes decisions 
such as the “Going Out” strategy and FTAs. It directs the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to implement its decisions (Sun 
2014). FTAs regarding specific countries or regions of the world must be discussed and 
approved by the PSC. Issues relating to Africa are rarely raised at the PSC, and therefore, a 
decision involving a FTA with the three countries cannot be discussed (Sun 2014, 18-19). 
The MOFCOM and the MFA are the ones managing and coordinating China’s foreign policy 
regarding Africa. This suggests that China’s overall economic interest in Africa is small. 
Signing a FTA with African countries is not a priority for China.   
Fourth, a potential Chinese FTA with Nigeria and South Africa may have impacts on the 
manufacturing sectors in both countries. This may not be the case in Sudan because its 
manufacturing sector is small.  Already, there are concerns that imports of certain products 
from China are responsible for the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector in South Africa. 
The textile industry in Nigeria has declined, accompanied by job losses. Given these reasons, 
the economic structure of the three countries may prevent them from signing a FTA with 
China.  
6.2 Likely China FTA Partner: Nigeria, South Africa or Sudan? 
The discussions above indicate that it is not likely that China will sign a FTA with Nigeria, 
South Africa or Sudan in the near future. If we look over the medium-longer term, then it is 
worth asking which of the three countries might be the most likely candidate to develop a 
FTA with China. China starts and completes FTA negotiations with countries that have good 
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credit ratings and healthy economies. Compared to Nigeria and Sudan, South Africa has a 
relatively good credit rating (Gumede 2016). Although South Africa is currently experiencing 
political challenges, which have affected the economy (Guardian 2017), South Africa’s 
political problems do not usually last as long as in Nigeria and Sudan. For example, in 2015 
President Jacob Zuma removed his finance minister. Market volatility and a weak currency 
(South African Rand) also occurred in 2015, which were the direct result of Zuma’s action 
(Cohen and Vollgraaff 2015).  However, the situation was later normalised after a brief 
period of time. In addition, China seems to have valued South Africa more than the two other 
African countries, namely, Nigeria and Sudan. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, has visited 
Africa twice. On both visits, he visited South Africa (BBC 2013 and  Gaffey 2015).This, no 
doubt, demonstrates that South Africa is more valuable to China. Before this might be a 
possibility, South Africa in particular, and probably Africa in general, would need to rise up 
China’s policy aganeda and be reflected in receiving higher level decision-making attention 
in China. Furthermore, there would likely need to be some assurances for the South Afrian 
leadership that the manufacturing sector wuld be not be too adversely affected. Both of these 
factors make a FTA with China unlikely in the short-term but, if they change over the 
medium-longer term then South Africa appears to be the most likely FTA partner in Africa 
for China. 
6.3 Conclusion 
China-Africa relations have improved over the years. The relationship, which was once 
focused on diplomatic and political recognition from African countries, later changed its 
objectives to pave the way for an increase in the volume of trade. Initially, the relationship 
was largely defined by China’s interests considering the phases of the relationship. Apart 
from trade, China has committed to huge investments in upgrading Africa’s infrastructure. 
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Just like African countries, China has signed FTAs. But China’s FTAs are strategically 
signed in view of the number of countries and the parts of the world where they have been 
signed.  
A FTA as trade framework became more widespread after the US abandoned Article 24 of 
the GATT agreement in the 1980s. This has raised concerns about whether the proliferation 
of FTAs will undermine or accelerate multilateral trade, as enshrined in the WTO. 
Nonetheless, trade talks under the WTO have been stalled. The pace at which FTAs are 
negotiated and signed may complicate meaningful negotiation among WTO member-states.   
China has signed FTAs with many countries across the world, but it has not signed a FTA 
with any country in Africa. The three African countries selected in this study have the 
economic characteristics with which China selects its FTA partners. The three countries have 
also met the criteria with which China signs FTA. Beyond having the economic 
characteristics and meeting China’s partners’ selection criteria, the three African countries 
are not valuable to China’s national interests. China’s trade and foreign policies are 
coordinated by the MOFCOM and the MFA. These two agencies make decisions when it 
relates to Africa but they cannot make decisions on behalf of the Chinese government to sign 
a FTA with the three Africa countries. The supreme decision-making body in China is the 
PSC. It is only the PSC that can decide if China should sign a FTA with African countries. 
Lastly, the three African countries feel threatened that a FTA with China will undermine their 
manufacturing sectors. Already, imports from China compete with local manufacturing 
industries in the three African countries. This means each of the three countries in this study 
will continue to engage China with the existing frameworks available to each of them.  
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